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D . Sum m ary .............................................
1617
C onclu sion ....................................................
16 18
The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service interpret the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) using
several formats, but Treasury regulations are by far the most
prominent and carry the greatest legal weight.1 Identifying the
proper standard for evaluating Treasury regulations that interpret the Code should be easy: Treasury regulations are entitled to Chevron deference. Yet more than twenty years after the
Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,2 the question of judicial deference
toward Treasury regulations remains stubbornly unresolved.
The circuits are split and scholars are divided over whether
Chevron deference or some other evaluative standard should
apply to judicial review of Treasury regulations.3 The Seventh
Circuit, quite rightly, has labeled this "seemingly simple" issue
4
a "free-fire zone" and a "melee."
In its more recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,
the Court offered a new test aimed at resolving long-standing
5
disagreements over when Chevron deference should apply.
Mead makes clear that Chevron deference is warranted only for
agency interpretations promulgated through the exercise of
congressionally delegated authority to bind regulated parties
with the force of law. 6 Since there is no question that Treasury
regulations are legally binding upon taxpayers and the government alike, to the extent that there was real doubt before

1.

See BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDI-

46.01[3] (3d ed. 2002) (recognizing Treasury regulations as the
most authoritative administrative guidance issued by the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service); MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE
3.01 (2d ed. 2002) (same).
2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 245 F.3d 149, 154 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001) (acknowledging the split); Cent. Pa. Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 384, 390-92
(1995) (noting Chevron's "checkered career in the tax arena"); Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1,
41-50 (2004) (summarizing the disagreement).
4. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 977-78 (7th
Cir. 1998).
5. 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). As the sole dissenter from Mead, Justice
Scalia described the Court's decision as "one of the most significant opinions
ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial review of administrative
action." Id. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 226-27 (majority opinion).
VIDUALS
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Mead whether Treasury regulations are entitled to Chevron
7
deference, the Mead inquiry should easily resolve the issue.
Yet the post-Mead scholarship and jurisprudence continues to
avoid that straight-forward conclusion.
Settling the question of deference toward Treasury regulations carries significant implications for both tax jurisprudence
and tax policy. Chevron deference is premised on assumptions
about congressional delegations of primary interpretive authority.8 Such delegations in turn reflect a presumptive evaluation
that independent and executive branch agencies, rather than
the courts, should be responsible for the policy choices inherent
in statutory interpretation. 9 Treasury officials are more democratically accountable, are better positioned to respond through
regulations to changes in taxpayer behavior and tax policy
trends, and possess significantly more expertise over the complexities of the tax laws than most judges. 10 Yet the consequence of less judicial deference to Treasury regulations is
greater judicial intervention in tax policy. Allowing judges to
7. But see William S. Jordan, III, JudicialReview of Informal Statutory
Interpretations:The Answer is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead,
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 719, 719 (2002) (describing Mead's test as "a cumbersome,
unworkable regime under which courts must draw increasingly fine distinctions using impossibly vague standards"); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction:
Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 353-58 (2003) (criticizing

Mead as overly abstract, "producing a great deal of confusion and error").
8. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.
Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005) (noting a delegation premise); Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27
(same); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, MetaRules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 812 (2002) ("At the most
general level, Mead eliminates any doubt that Chevron deference is grounded
in congressional intent.").
9. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865-66 (1984) (emphasizing the reasons for delegation). But see infra note
278 and accompanying text (noting the fictionality of this presumption).
10. A small number of lower court judges have extensive tax expertise.
The United States Tax Court, an Article I court, specializes in and handles
only tax matters, and most tax cases are brought before this court. See I.R.C.
§ 7442 (2000) (establishing Tax Court jurisdiction); BITTKER, supra note 1,
51.0311] (discussing Tax Court history and jurisdiction). The Tax Court's decisions, and particularly its legal interpretations, are reviewable by the generalist circuit courts of appeals and the United States Supreme Court, however.
See I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1) (2000) (providing for appellate review of Tax Court decisions); BITTKER, supra note 1, 51.07 (summarizing appellate review of Tax
Court decisions). Tax refund claims are also included within the comparatively
limited subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, another Article I court, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Judges on these
courts are not necessarily tax specialists, either. See BITTKER, supra note 1,
51.08.
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second-guess Treasury's interpretive choices increases the incidence of like taxpayers not being treated alike, as circuits split
and Treasury's ability to resolve interpretive issues is hampered by stare decisis. Congressional preference aside, these
factors represent powerful normative arguments in favor of
Chevron deference for Treasury regulations.
Several prominent tax scholars and practitioners have
written thoroughly and eloquently against applying Chevron
deference to at least some, if not all, Treasury regulations.11
Doctrinally, the arguments against applying Chevron to Treasury regulations draw principally from a belief that the tax area
has its own, unique deference tradition represented principally
by the Court's pre-Chevron opinion in NationalMuffler Dealers
Association v. Commissioner.12 The normative arguments
against Chevron deference for Treasury regulations likewise
rely on various assertions that "tax is different" to support
greater judicial involvement in interpreting the Code.
To some extent, these scholarly efforts reflect varying conceptions of what Chevron is and does. Of course different understandings of Chevron will yield disparate opinions as to how
the Chevron doctrine should apply in the tax context. Yet that
aspect of the existing scholarship merely reflects the more general scholarly disagreement over Chevron's meaning. Where
tax scholars and practitioners addressing the issue of tax deference are fairly consistent is in their insistence that when it
comes to Chevron, tax is special and should be treated differently from other areas of administrative law.
The framework articulated in Chevron and Mead has many
critics. 1 3 Nevertheless, the deference model offered by these

cases represents the present administrative law norm. This fact
alone does not necessitate cross-disciplinary uniformity. The

11.
12.
13.

See infra Part I.D (summarizing the existing scholarship).
440 U.S. 472, 484-87 (1979).
See, e.g., Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of

Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (calling

Chevron "a siren's song, seductive but treacherous" for the "fundamental alterations it makes in our constitutional conception of the administrative
state"); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative
State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 68-81 (2000) (suggesting that Chevron deference undermines the judicial role in our constitutional structure); Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405,
445-46 (1989) (stating that Chevron confuses ambiguity with delegation and
contravenes established separation of powers principles).
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courts should be open to deviating from legal norms where circumstances justify departure. Ernest Gellhorn and Glen Robinson notoriously decried "the tendency of administrative law to
examine the process of judicial review without reference to the
14
substantive content of the agency action being reviewed."
Mead itself requires a statute-by-statute, agency-by- agency
evaluation of Chevron's applicability. The courts should not reject legal norms simply for the sake of doing so, however. Deviation should be premised only on clear justification; such justification should be context-specific, not a mere rehashing of
the general criticism of the norm.
Yet the emphasis of the existing scholarship on the
uniqueness of the tax field-and the resulting complexity that
this focus has added to what otherwise should be a fairly simple analysis-are emblematic of a perception of tax exceptionalism that intrudes upon much contemporary tax scholarship and
jurisprudence. 1 5 The view that tax is different or special creates, among other problems, a cloistering effect that too often
leads practitioners, scholars, and courts considering tax issues
to misconstrue or disregard otherwise interesting and relevant
developments in non-tax areas, even when the questions involved are not particularly unique to tax.' 6 The ongoing debate
over judicial deference toward tax regulations offers an especially frustrating example of this tax exceptionalism at work.
A few scholars have suggested that, perhaps, Chevron and
National Muffler can be reconciled in favor of Chevron deference for Treasury regulations. 17 Others have lamented the tendency of tax scholars and practitioners to ignore the broader legal universe in evaluating tax issues, including the deference
question.' 8 To date, however, no one has squarely refuted the
exceptionalist claims about the uniqueness of tax deference
14. Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative
Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 783 (1975); see also John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 35, 35 (1995) (quoting same).
15. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow
Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 531 (1994) (discussing this phenomenon).
16. See id. at 518-19.
17. See David A. Brennen, Treasury Regulations and JudicialDeference in
the Post-Chevron Era, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 428-30 (1997) (attempting to
reconcile the Court's post-Chevron tax jurisprudence with Chevron); Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 3, at 47-53 (equating Chevron's analysis with that
of NationalMuffler and applying Chevron to anti-abuse Treasury regulations).
18. See Caron, supra note 15, at 518, 531-36.
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traditions and practices and the resulting case against Chevron
deference toward Treasury regulations. This Article fills that
void in the literature and explains why the more straightforward conclusion of Chevron deference for Treasury regulations really is the right one, despite previous scholarly and judicial efforts to complicate the matter. More broadly, however,
the Article debunks the perception of tax exceptionalism that, I
believe, is the primary reason why the issue of Chevron deference for tax regulations continues to be so thorny.
My argument is a comparative one, laying tax and non-tax
jurisprudence, scholarship, and regulatory practice side by side
to show that tax does not have, has never had, and should not
have its own unique deference tradition. National Muffler offers nothing more than a particularly clear articulation of the
Court's pre-Chevron approach toward a broad category of
agency actions that included, but was not limited to, most
Treasury regulations. Chevron and Mead clearly extend the
applicability of strong, mandatory judicial deference to encompass that group of comparable agency actions in other administrative law contexts; so the courts should apply that same
standard to Treasury regulations as well. The normative case is
similar, as a comparison of tax and non-tax case law and practices shows that tax has more in common with other complex
regulatory areas where Chevron clearly applies than tax lawyers tend to recognize.
Part I of this Article will briefly summarize the Chevron/Mead framework, the allegedly competing National Muffler
standard, and the ongoing debate over the relationship between
the two. Part II will articulate the case against tax exceptionalism in judicial deference. Part II.A. will establish the tax deference tradition as well within the larger context of more general
administrative law jurisprudence and scholarship from the
early days of the Internal Revenue Code to the present; and
Part II.B will similarly compare tax and non-tax cases and
practices to refute various normative arguments raised to justify a different deference standard in the tax context. Part III of
this Article will then apply Mead's two-part test to illustrate
that Treasury regulations are entitled to Chevron deference.
I. DUELING DEFERENCE STANDARDS
Underlying the argument against judicial deference toward
Treasury regulations is a certain degree of hostility toward
Chevron that is not limited to tax scholars and practitioners.
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Many critics of Chevron generally are wary of agency authority
absent strong judicial oversight; 19 and many in the tax community regard Treasury's authority over the Code absent strong

judicial oversight with similar misgiving. 20 Given Chevron's
dominance in other areas of administrative law, it is to be expected that those with such concerns might argue in favor of
carving out an exception for tax cases. The question is whether
there is a case for doing so.
The tax-specific argument against judicial deference toward Treasury regulations flows from a combination of terminology and tradition. As with most government agencies,
Treasury and the IRS are bound to follow the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). 21 The APA requires agencies promulgating regulations to follow public notice and comment procedures
in developing certain types of regulations unless one of several
listed exceptions applies. 22 Drawing from pre-APA terminology,
regulations for which the APA requires notice and comment are
called "legislative" rules, while one of the exceptions from the
notice and comment requirements is for so-called "interpretative rules," also known by the minimally shorter "interpretive

rules."23

19. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal
Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the
Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 165, 182 (1992) (advocating

"aggressive judicial review of agency rule-making" to ameliorate separation of
powers concerns); Farina, supra note 13, at 452-53 (criticizing Chevron as exacerbating an imbalance in federal separation of powers); Sunstein, supra note
13, at 446 (calling for a "firm judicial hand in the interpretation of statutes").
20. See, e.g., Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731, 758 (2002) (expressing concerns about antitaxpayer bias); Irving Salem et al., ABA Section on Taxation: Report of the
Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 724-25 (2004) (raising
questions about IRS motivations and willingness to push statutory boundaries).
21. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is a statute passed by Congress in 1946 that mandates procedures for different formats of federal governmental agency action, including the promulgation of regulations, or "rules"
in APA terminology. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2000).
22. See id. § 553(b).
23. See id. § 551. The APA itself does not use the legislative term to describe rules subject to the notice and comment requirements. However, explanations of APA provisions and both pre- and post-APA literature and jurisprudence use the term in distinguishing such rules from interpretative rules. See
1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.1, at 305 (4th
ed. 2002); Robert C. Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts,
54 HARv. L. REV. 377, 384-85 (1941); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative
Rules-Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 919-31
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Treasury utilizes two types of delegated authority in
promulgating Treasury regulations. 24 Many provisions of the
25
Code contain specific grants of authority to issue regulations.
The vast majority of Treasury regulations, however, are established through the exercise of general rulemaking authority in
I.R.C. § 7805(a), which grants Treasury the power to develop
"all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of" the
Code. 26 Even where a specific authority grant supports a
Treasury regulation, Treasury often will cite I.R.C. § 7805(a) as
the primary or only authority behind the regulation in ques27
tion.
(1948); Frederic P. Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J.
1, 2 (1940).
24. Although the I.R.C. delegates authority for promulgating regulations
to the Secretary of the Treasury, see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1502, 7805(a) (2000), and
Treasury regulations are issued by the Treasury Department, the IRS Office of
Chief Counsel performs the function of initially drafting most regulations. See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL,
§ 32.1.1.4.4 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/ch01s01.html
[hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL]; see also LEANDRA LEDERMAN &
STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1.04
(2d ed. 2002). This division of labor is consistent with historic practice. See
Paul F. Schmid, The Tax Regulations Making Progress-Then and Now, 24
TAX LAW. 541, 541-49 (1971) (describing past procedures for promulgating
Treasury regulations). Despite the IRS's involvement in the regulatory process, because Treasury is the final and official issuer of Treasury regulations,
this Article only addresses Treasury as the primary interpreter of the I.R.C.
25. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(i)(5), 167(e)(6), 357(d)(3), 453(j)(1), 952(d), 1502
(2000). A search in the Westlaw FTX-USCA database for specific authority
delegations derived from just one common phrasing, "'Secretary shall' /s prescribe/s regulations," resulted in 291 hits as of April 2006.
26. I.R.C. § 7805(a).
27. See, e.g., T.D. 9192, 2005-15 I.R.B. 866; T.D. 9155, 2004-40 I.R.B.562;
T.D. 9154, 2004-40 I.R.B. 560; T.D. 8825, 1999-28 I.R.B. 19; T.D. 8560, 199438 I.R.B. 5; T.D. 8531, 1994-17 I.R.B. 7; see also Boeing Co. v. United States,
537 U.S. 437, 447-48 (2002) (noting Treasury's reliance on I.R.C. § 7805(a)
(2000) notwithstanding the applicable specific authority grant); Ellen P.
Aprill, Muffled Chevron: JudicialReview of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV.
51, 57 & nn.28-29 (1996) (noting Treasury's position that tax regulations are
almost always interpretative). For example, the Treasury issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking in 1992 and published final regulations in 1994 that
dramatically overhauled the investment adjustment system for consolidated
entities under I.R.C. § 1502, one of the broadest specific authority delegations
in the Code. See T.D. 8560, 1994-38 I.R.B. 5; Proposed Rules, Dep't of Treasury, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,634 (Nov. 12, 1992); ANDREW J. DUBROFF ET AL., FED.
ERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS FILING CONSOLIDATED RETURNS
§ 1.02 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the regulatory history of Treasury). In both the
original notice and the final Treasury decision, the IRS cited § 7805 as the
primary authority supporting the regulation and I.R.C. § 1502 and other specific authority grant provisions only for certain limited aspects of the new
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The tax community differentiates the two types of regulations by calling specific authority regulations "legislative" and
general authority ones "interpretative." 28 Nevertheless, in practice, Treasury purports to develop all of its regulations,
whether premised upon specific or general authority, using the
APA's public notice and comment procedures. 29 Since long before Chevron, however, and consistent with the tax community's categorization, Treasury has taken the position that its
general authority regulations are interpretative only and that
it does not have to follow the notice-and-comment process for
such regulations. 30 Since Treasury regularly cites I.R.C.
§ 7805(a) as the legal basis even for regulations that seemingly
fall within the scope of a specific authority provision, Treasury's position on this point means that Treasury rarely admits
to the applicability of the APA's notice and comment requirements.
With National Muffler and other, earlier tax cases, the
Court spoke directly to the question of judicial deference in the
tax context. In the years before deciding Chevron, the Supreme
Court was quite clear that it considered general authority
Treasury regulations elaborating ambiguous or undefined
statutory terms to be interpretative in nature and entitled to
31
less deference than specific authority Treasury regulations.
The accepted theory among the tax community is that, at least
before Chevron if not also after, specific authority Treasury
regulations were given "controlling deference," meaning that
regulations. See T.D. 8560, 1994-38 I.R.B. 5; Proposed Rules, Dep't of Treasury, 57 Fed. Reg. at 53,634 (Nov. 12, 1992). In the final Treasury Decision, the
Treasury stated without explanation its position that the APA's notice and
comment requirements were inapplicable notwithstanding the clearly legislative nature of these regulations. See T.D. 8560, 1994-38 I.R.B. 5.
28. See, e.g., LEDERMAN & MAZZA, supra note 24, § 9.02[A][1]; SALTZMAN,
supra note 1, 1 3.02[3][a]-[b] (2d ed. 2002); Aprill, supra note 27, at 56-57;
Coverdale, supra note 14, at 35; Salem et al., supra note 20, at 728.
29. See LEDERMAN & MAZZA, supra note 24, § 9.02[A][1]; Michael Asimow,
Public Participationin the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 524 (1977); Peter A. Lowy & Juan F. Vasquez,
Jr., 101 J. TAx'N 230, 231 (2004). My own sense from reviewing the Treasury's
notices and final Treasury Decisions is that the Treasury's adherence to APA
rulemaking requirements is sufficiently spotty to be susceptible to legal challenge. More substantial analysis of this perception is beyond the scope of this
Article.
30. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 24, § 32.1.2.3 (2004); Salem et al., supra note 20, at 728.
31. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24-25 (1982);
Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 252-53 (1981).
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the courts would only reject such regulations if they were
plainly inconsistent with the statute. Meanwhile, general authority Treasury regulations were accorded some lesser degree
of "weight" to the extent they satisfied various factors articulated in National Muffler and its predecessors. 32 In practice,
33
the Court has not always been so consistent.
Chevron was not a tax case, and the Court's post-Chevron
analysis of Treasury regulations has been markedly erratic and
thus can be read to support almost any argument. 34 Ultimately,
however, those in favor of tax exceptionalism rely largely on
pre-Chevron practices and deference doctrine to excuse tax
from the broader Chevron revolution. Like any other revolution, Chevron altered preexisting norms. Consequently, arguments against applying Chevron in the tax context that are
premised on pre-Chevron standards only work if the preChevron tax tradition differs from the broader jurisprudence
supplanted by Chevron.
Part II below explains why I believe that the supposedly
unique tax-deference tradition is in fact not at all exceptional,
and instead merely reflects general pre-Chevron administrative
law doctrine. To understand that discussion fully, however, it is
important briefly to review the two allegedly competing deference approaches-the Chevron/Mead framework and National
Muffler-and the struggle of scholars and courts to reconcile
them. Although National Muffler was decided first chronologically, Chevron and Mead represent the current general norm
against which to evaluate National Muffler (rather than vice
versa, as some in the tax community seem to believe). Accordingly, let us consider the Chevron regime first.

32. See Aprill, supra note 27, at 58-61 (describing tax deference standards); Coverdale, supra note 14, at 53, 63-75 (same).
33. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Portland Cement Co. 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981)
(applying National Muffler deference to a specific authority Treasury regulation); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533 (1978) (applying strong deference to a general authority Treasury regulation); see also 5 KENNETH CULP
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 424 (2d ed. 1984) (noting the Court's
inconsistency).
34. Compare Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991)
(citing National Muffler), with Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,
507 U.S. 546, 575-76 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing both National Muffler and Chevron), and Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382, 387-89
(1998) (citing Chevron and applying its two-step analytical approach). See also
infra Part II.A.3.
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CHEVRON (AND MEAD AND SKIDMORE)

The Chevron story is so well-known that it can be quickly
summarized. Similar to I.R.C. § 7805(a), the Clean Air Act
gives the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) the authority to "prescribe such regulations as
are necessary to carry out his functions under" the Act. 35 Using
APA notice and comment procedures, the EPA exercised its
general rulemaking authority to promulgate a regulation defining a statutorily undefined term freighted with policy implications, "stationary source." 3 6 A change in presidential administrations prompted reconsideration, however, and the EPA
employed the same procedures again to adopt a new regulatory
37
definition with different consequences for regulated parties.
In upholding the latter interpretation against a challenge by
the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court
called for a strong form of judicial deference for all such agency
regulations, so long as the regulations were "reasonable." The
Court chastised the Court of Appeals, which had rejected the
new regulation, for substituting its own judgment for that of
38
the agency.
Chevron is most often recognized for the two-part inquiry
the Court articulated for evaluating agency interpretations of
law: first, whether the statute being interpreted clearly and
unambiguously resolves the issue; and if not, whether the
39
agency's interpretation of the statute is a permissible one.
Standing alone, however, the two-part test is remarkable more
as a tool for organizing judicial analysis than as a doctrinal
statement. Even before Chevron, if the meaning of the statute
was plain, then there was no opportunity for an agency to claim
judicial deference. 4 0 Unambiguous statutes are not susceptible

35. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1) (2000).
36. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
840-41 (1984) (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981)).
37. See id. at 853-57 (discussing the history of the EPA's amendments
and definitions).
38. See id. at 843-45.
39. See id. at 843-44.
40. See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-19 (1978) (rejecting an
agency interpretation as inconsistent with the statutory language); Zuber v.
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 181, 183-85 (1969) (same); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 610-11 (1944) (same); Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) ("True indeed it is that administrative
practice does not avail to overcome a statute so plain in its commands as to
leave nothing for construction.").
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of multiple interpretations; and absent constitutionality issues,
it is axiomatic that the courts are bound to follow the clearly
expressed intent of Congress. Moreover, long before deciding
Chevron, the Court advocated strong, mandatory deference toward "legislative" regulations promulgated pursuant to express
41
congressional command.
The more revolutionary but less often recognized aspect of
Chevron is its call for strong, mandatory deference not only
where Congress specifically mandates regulations, but also
where Congress implicitly delegates rulemaking authority
through the combination of statutory ambiguity and administrative responsibility, as exemplified by the Clean Air Act and
the EPA. 42 This extension of strong judicial deference from explicit to so-called implicit delegations represents a transfer of
interpretive power from the judicial branch to administrative
agencies. 4 3 This, more than the two-part test, is the heart of the
44
Chevron doctrine.
Why extend the Court's existing strong deference tradition
beyond legislative regulations promulgated pursuant to express
congressional command? The Court here was quite plain. Resolving statutory ambiguity necessarily implicates choosing
among various policy alternatives; and it is the job of adminis41. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937); AT&T Corp. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232,
236-37 (1936); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES:
1989 SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 2D at 505-14 (1989)

(suggesting

that

Chevron reflects

long-standing

doctrine);

BERNARD

SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.34 (3d ed. 1991) (same); see also infra

Part II.A (discussing pre-Chevron deference standards).
42. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 ("Sometimes the legislative delegation to
an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a
case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." (emphasis added)); see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44) (recognizing statutory ambiguity as a delegation of interpretive authority to agencies); DAVIS, supra note 41, at 508, 525 (acknowledging Chevron's expansion of
the strong deference doctrine).
43. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 41, at 508 (describing Chevron as transferring power from courts to agencies); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 834 (2001) (same); Cass R. Sunstein,
Law and AdministrationAfter Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990)
(same).
44. See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 759, 762 (1991);
Farina, supra note 13, at 456-57.
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tering agencies, not the courts, to make those policy choices. 45
By recognizing that there may be more than one permissible
way to interpret an ambiguous statute, and allowing the
agency freedom within the boundaries of permissibility, the
Court not only gives an agency flexibility to choose the policy
alternative it thinks best, but also allows the agency to change
its mind if its first approach proves inadequate or ill conceived

in hindsight.

46

Nevertheless, for most of Chevron's tenure, it has been un47
clear precisely how far the Court intended to extend its reach.
As in Chevron itself, the most obvious implicit delegation would
seem to be a general grant of authority to issue rules and/or
regulations where necessary to implement and administer a
statute.48 Chevron jurisprudence from the 1990s is a mess of
circuit splits and general confusion over the scope of the doctrine's applicability-asking, among other things, the question
49
of what precisely constitutes an implicit delegation.
A primary source of the confusion over Chevron's applicability was disagreement among courts and scholars over the legal foundation supporting the Chevron doctrine. 50 The Chevron
opinion itself sounds themes of congressional delegation,
51
agency technical expertise, and democratic accountability.
45.

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45 (quoting United States v. Shimer,

367 U.S. 374, 382, 383 (1961)).
46. In the Chevron opinion alone, the Court's willingness to permit an
agency to change its mind is apparent. First, the Court disregarded the fact
that the EPA initially adopted one regulatory definition but then, upon a
change of presidential administrations, reconsidered the issue and adopted the
definition at issue through a second round of notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Second, the Court criticized the D.C. Circuit for adopting a "static" definition
of stationary source even though the statute was more flexible. Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842, 857-58; see also Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2699-2700 (describing "the
whole point of Chevron" as to give agencies "the discretion provided by" statutory ambiguity to change interpretations "in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change in administrations").
47. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind
Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3-5 (1990); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 199-203
(1998); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 835.
48. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with
the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 471 (2002).
49. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 848-52.
50. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2139 (2002) (discussing the debate); Merrill
& Hickman, supranote 43, at 863-73 (same).
51. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 865; see also, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995) (emphasiz-
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Scholars posited a variety of legal foundations for Chevron including not only congressional delegation 5 2 but others ranging
53
to mere judicial policy. 54
from constitutional requirement
Changing Chevron's underlying premise alters the scope of the
doctrine's applicability. 55 Complicating the issue further still
was the conception that the choice for the courts would be
56
Chevron's strong, mandatory deference or no deference at all,
notwithstanding clear policy arguments in favor of some deference even where strong Chevron deference might seem inap57
propriate.
The Court took a significant step toward resolving the general confusion, however, in United States v. Mead Corp. Mead
declared congressional delegation to be the underlying rationale for Chevron deference and offered a companion two-part
test for determining whether Chevron should apply in a given
situation: first, whether Congress has given the agency in question the authority to bind regulated parties with "the force of

ing agency expertise); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S.
546, 575 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing regulation writing as
inherently political); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696-97
(1991) (stressing agency expertise and respect for political branches).
52. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 47, at 4; Michael Herz, Textualism and
Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
1663, 1666 (1991); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretationsof Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612,
623-27 (1996); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 872; Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
516-17.
53. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies
and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225,
2227 (1997).
54. See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency
Interpretationsof Statutes?: A New DoctrinalBasis for Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1289-98; William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 618-19
(1992); David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of JudicialDeference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 357-62 (2000).
55. See Callahan, supra note 54, at 1294; Gans, supra note 20, at 734-35;
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 863-73.
56. See, e.g., Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481, 483-84 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); United States v. Richards, 67 F.3d 1531, 1542 (10th Cir. 1995); Rapaport v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
57. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001) (indicating that in the absence of Chevron deference, there are still viable policy reasons for granting a lesser degree of deference); see also Merrill & Hickman,
supra note 43, at 858-63 (discussing same).
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law"; and if so, whether the agency has "exercised that authority."58 As part of that scheme, Mead and its foreshadowing
predecessor, Christensen v. Harris County,5 9 clearly establish
that the choice for the courts is not between Chevron or no deference at all by revitalizing the classic, pre-Chevron deference
case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 60 as an intermediate deferen-

61
tial alternative.
Like Chevron after it, Skidmore required the Court to consider the validity of an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous
statute, in this case the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) concerning eligibility for overtime pay. 62 The Administrator of the
Department of Labor's Wage and Hours Division had issued
only informal rulings applying the statute in various circumstances, as opposed to a regulation; and none of those rulings
resolved the case in question. 63 Nevertheless, the Administrator filed an amicus brief expressing his view of how that informal guidance should be applied to the case at bar. 64 Congress
had expressly by statute given the courts, rather than the Administrator, primary interpretive responsibility over the
FLSA;65 but the Court recognized its own past practice of giving
weight to interpretations by executive agencies of statutes they
administered. 66 To reconcile these considerations, the Court offered a series of factors for courts to use in assessing the appropriate level of judicial deference toward agency views in such

58. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
59. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
60. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
61. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Christensen,529 U.S. at 587.
62. The FLSA requires employers to pay one and one-half times an employee's regular wages for hours worked in excess of forty per week. See 29
U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000). The question before the Court in Skidmore was
whether firefighters were working for purposes of the FLSA overtime provision during the time they were required to be on duty at or near the firehouse
to respond to incoming fire alarms, even though the firefighters typically spent
such waiting time sleeping or engaged in other amusement activities like pool
or dominos. 323 U.S. at 136. In a companion case, Armour & Co. v. Wantock,
323 U.S. 126 (1944), the Court analyzed the relevant statutory provisions and
found the question dependent upon the interpretation of the statutory definition of "employ" as "to suffer or permit work," which definition the Court found
not to be dispositive of the Skidmore question. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136
(discussing Armour); see also Armour, 323 U.S. at 133-34.
63. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 138-39.
64. See id. at 139.
65. See id. at 137 (citing Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 523
(1942)).
66. See id. at 140.
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circumstances:
The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to con67
trol.

By its own terms, Skidmore "respect" is both limited and
open ended. 68 Skidmore allows a reviewing court to be the final
arbiter of whether the agency's interpretation is persuasive but
specifies some factors and allows for the existence of others
69
that a court should consider in evaluating the agency's case.
Some commentators have likened Skidmore respect to a sliding
scale, with informal agency interpretations qualifying for levels
of deference ranging from Chevron-like to none at all depending
upon a court's analysis of the various factors.o Others would
71
describe Skidmore as considerably less defined.
Regardless of the precise contours of Skidmore respect,
Chevron and Skidmore have divergent justifications and serve

67. Id. Citing Skidmore, the Mead Court paraphrased these factors in saying that agency interpretations not entitled to Chevron deference should be
evaluated based upon "the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position." United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001).
68. In its holding, the Mead Court held that the tariff ruling at issue was
entitled to "respect according to its persuasiveness." Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.
Alluding to this phraseology, some scholars use the term "Skidmore respect"
rather than "Skidmore deference" in distinguishing the Skidmore approach
from Chevron deference. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the
Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185, 198 n.80 (2004) (explaining his rationale
for using "Skidmore respect" terminology); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference:
Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1105, 1127, 1132-33 (2001) (using the phrase). But see Merrill &
Hickman, supra note 43, at 855 (suggesting that Skidmore is better regarded
as a true deference doctrine). Thorough consideration of whether Skidmore's
standard is more appropriately characterized as truly deferential or merely
respectful is beyond the scope of this Article. Solely for purposes of clarity, I
will refer to the Skidmore standard as "Skidmore respect" rather than
"Skidmore deference."
69. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (describing informal rulings as "not
controlling upon the courts").
70. See Anthony, supra note 47, at 14; Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 977 (1992).
71. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565-66 (1985) (recognizing the pre-Chevron deference doctrine as reflecting degrees of deference and discussing relevant factors); Rossi, supra note 68, at 1125-29 (analyzing Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), as reflecting three different views of Skidmore
respect).
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different purposes. As the Supreme Court in Mead affirmed,
Chevron "rests on a presumption about congressional intent"
that Congress, at least implicitly, wanted an agency rather
than the courts to be the primary interpreter of a particular
statutory scheme.7 2 Chevron's scope is limited, with Chevron
only applying where a court affirmatively finds that Congress
implicitly delegated primary interpretive power and the agency
73
at least exercised that power with the action in question.
Moreover, Chevron does not call on the courts to abdicate their
responsibility for interpreting the law altogether. The APA
clearly contemplates judicial oversight of agency action; 74 and
Chevron has never been a blank check. 75 But where the reviewing court finds the requisite delegation and exercise thereof,
and where Congress either declined or failed to resolve the
question at issue, Chevron deference is required.
By contrast, Skidmore is at heart a doctrine of judicial
prudence. Even where the courts, rather than the agency, are
the designated interpreter of statutory language, the courts
may lack the resources and expertise to understand and evaluate fully the consequences of complex statutory schemes. 7 6 As
the Court acknowledged in Skidmore, agencies often are simply
better positioned to assess and apply alternative statutory interpretations. 77 Where the courts are satisfied that an agency is
not otherwise behaving in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, they are often sensible to defer to the agency's greater expertise and, sometimes, extensive interpretive efforts.7 8 By fo72. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30 n.11.
73. Id. at 226-27; see also Merrill, supra note 8, at 813 (describing Mead's
holding).
74. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
75. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 481 (2001)
(rejecting the agency's interpretation at Chevron step two); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000) (rejecting the agency's
interpretation at Chevron step one); AT&T Corp. v. Ia. Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366, 389-92 (1999) (rejecting the agency's interpretation at Chevron step two).
76. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
77. See id.
78. Where Skidmore or even Chevron deference applies to an agency's legal interpretation, the courts still evaluate agency action for adequacy of process under the arbitrary and capricious review standard of APA § 706(2)(A). See
Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983); see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699-2700 (2005) (discussing the relationship
between Chevron and hard-look review); Martin v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157-58 (1991) (noting the applicability
of both Skidmore and hard look review).

1554

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1537

cusing as much on the agency's thoroughness and consistency
as on the interpretation itself, the Skidmore factors allow a reviewing court leeway to police and defer to an agency simultaneously. And by bringing Skidmore back into the deference
lexicon, Mead appropriately precludes Chevron deference from
impermissibly encroaching upon the function that Congress,
through the APA, intended courts to serve.
B. THE NATIONAL MUFFLER "ALTERNATIVE"
Although National Muffler predates Chevron by several
years, National Muffler quite resembles Chevron, in that National Muffler also involved a regulatory definition of an important but undefined statutory term, "business league." 79 Much
like the EPA in Chevron, Treasury initially exercised its general rulemaking authority under I.R.C. § 7805(a) to adopt a
80
definition that clearly would have included the petitioner.
Within a few years, however, Treasury changed its mind and
promulgated a new regulation with a narrower definition that
arguably excluded the petitioner.8 1 This second definition stood
unchanged and unchallenged for decades;8 2 but like the statutory term it defined, the regulation proved ambiguous, leading
the IRS to issue several clarifying revenue rulings.8 3 Applying
the standard it developed through those revenue rulings, the
IRS maintained that the petitioner's organization was not a
84
business league.
The Court's analysis in National Muffler is somewhat convoluted, which may partly explain why its post-Chevron applicability remains such a question. The petitioning taxpayer's
challenge raised two separate underlying issues: first, whether
Treasury properly interpreted the Code when it adopted its revised definition of business league; and second, whether the
IRS correctly interpreted its own regulation in concluding that
79. Section 501(c)(6) of the I.R.C. has long exempted from federal income
taxation any organization that is a business league. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(6)

(2000).
80. See Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 475-78
(1979).
81. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (2005).
82. The current definition was adopted in 1925. See Nat'l Muffler, 440
U.S. at 481.
83. Id. at 482-83; see also Rev. Rul. 76-400, 1976-2 C.B. 153; Rev. Rul. 68182, 1968-1 C.B. 263; Rev. Rul. 67-77, 1967-1 C.B. 138; Rev. Rul. 58-294, 19581 C.B. 244.
84. See Nat 7 Muffler, 440 U.S. at 488-89.
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the taxpayer was not a business league. The latter question arguably implicates a wholly separate pre-Chevron deference doctrine, known as Seminole Rock deference, which counsels deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation so
long as not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula85
tion."
Regardless, while recognizing the dual nature of the inquiry, the Court's opinion in National Muffler nevertheless
blends much of the analysis of the two questions. Speaking particularly to the regulation, the Court spoke at length of the appropriateness of deference. 86 The Court acknowledged Congress's delegation of rulemaking authority to Treasury,
Treasury's expertise in the field, and the need for consistent
treatment of taxpayers.8 7 While emphasizing particularly the
first of these considerations, the Court nevertheless articulated
a full grab-bag of relevant factors in considering the validity of
Treasury regulations:
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the
regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if it is a
substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those
presumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits
inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time the
regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency
85. Seminole Rock deference is named for the case that articulated it,
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). In that case, the
Court expressed a policy of strong, mandatory deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. Id. at 413-14. In lieu of Seminole Rock, the
Court often cites one of its progeny for the same proposition. See, e.g., Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512-13 (1994); Stinson v. United
States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1993); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). The
lower courts generally have recognized Chevron and Seminole Rock as separate deference doctrines, but lower courts occasionally have applied Chevron to
agency interpretations of agency regulations. See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc. v. United States, 106 F.3d 376, 378 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Malcomb v. Island
Creek Coal Co., 15 F.3d 364, 369 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Paralyzed Veterans
of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("It would seem
that there are few, if any, cases in which the standard applicable under Chevron would yield a different result [than under Seminole Rock]."). The significance of Chevron and Mead for Seminole Rock deference is unclear and beyond
the scope of this Article. For a defense of Seminole Rock in relation to Chevron
and Skidmore, see Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of
Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations,34 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 49 (2000).
86. See Nat'l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 475-77.
87. See id. at 477.
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of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments
of the statute.88

The Court then applied these factors to evaluate the regulation at issue, discussing at length the relevant statutory and
regulatory history, and also noting that the regulation was of
substantial duration and had been consistently applied by the
IRS in its series of revenue rulings.8 9 Ignoring its own earlier
inclusion of contemporaneity as a relevant factor, and perhaps
foreshadowing a bit Chevron's emphasis on regulatory flexibility and policy choice, the Court dismissed the observation that
the Treasury's current definition was not its first: "We would be
reluctant to adopt the rigid view that an agency may not alter
its interpretation in light of administrative experience." 90
Without distinguishing between the regulation and the revenue
rulings in its holding, the Court acknowledged that the government's interpretation was not "the only possible one," but
concluded that "it does bear a fair relationship to the language
of the statute, it reflects the views of those who sought its enactment, and it matches the purpose they articulated."9 1 Accordingly, the Court upheld that interpretation as meriting "serious deference" and "implement[ing] the congressional
92
mandate" in a "reasonable manner."
Particularly when viewed through a post-Mead lens, the
National Muffler opinion is perplexing. On the one hand, the
analytical approach suggested by the National Muffler standard closely resembles the multifactor inquiry advocated by
Skidmore. At the same time, however, the Court dismissed the
relevance of contemporaneity, approved of allowing interpretive
flexibility, and otherwise spoke in a very Chevron-like manner
of delegation and of "serious" deference toward reasonable
regulations.
C. CONFLICTING JURISPRUDENCE

Interpreting National Muffler in the post-Chevron era has
confounded the lower courts. The circuit courts of appeal and

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
(1973)

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 476 (citing United States v. Cartwright, 441 U.S. 546, 550
and quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)).
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the Tax Court are divided on the relationship between the two
93
cases.
At least one circuit-the Sixth-has declared outright that,
post-Mead, Chevron deference applies to Treasury regulations
issued pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a) as well as to Treasury regulations expressly mandated by Congress. 94 Yielding a similar
outcome for different reasons, some of the circuit courts have
decided that Chevron and National Muffler are indistinguishable. 95 "[A]ny regulation which is 'based upon a permissible

construction' of an ambiguous statue will almost always 'implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner' and vice versa." 96 Accordingly, these courts also ultimately

apply the Chevron two-step analysis and controlling deference
standard in evaluating all Treasury regulations regardless of
their authority. Still other courts, however, believe National
Muffler to require a lesser degree of deference than Chevron.
Although the practical difference is not always apparent, in
such jurisdictions, specific authority regulations are given "controlling weight" pursuant to Chevron while general authority
are given only
regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805(a)
"considerable weight" under National Muffler. 97

93. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir.
2001) (acknowledging a split and reserving the question); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Comm'r, 245 F.3d 149, 154 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001) (same).
94. See Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 348 F.3d 136, 14041 (6th Cir. 2003).
95. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978-83
(7th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging some differences between the two cases but
concluding that they are practically indistinguishable); Tate & Lyle, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 87 F.3d 99, 106 n.13 (3d Cir. 1996) (equating the two doctrines implicitly by citation); Norwest Corp. v. Comm'r, 69 F.3d 1404, 1408-09 (8th Cir.
1995) (citing both Chevron and National Muffler for substantial deference to
reasonable Treasury regulations); Cent. Pa. Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 104 T.C.
384, 390-92 (1995) (seeing a negligible difference between the two doctrines).
The Eighth Circuit seems to follow this approach as well, but its precedents
are mixed. Compare Walshire v. United States, 288 F.3d 342, 345-46 (8th Cir.
2002) (citing Chevron for controlling deference toward general authority regulation), and Norwest, 69 F.3d at 1408-09 (citing both Chevron and National
Muffler for substantial deference to reasonable Treasury regulation), with St.
Jude Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Comm'r, 34 F.3d 1394, 1402 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying
less deferential National Muffler standard to general authority regulation).
96. Bankers Life, 142 F.3d at 981 (quoting Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Comm'r, 40 F.3d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1994)).
97. See Snowa v. Comm'r, 123 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 1997); see also
Schuler Indus., Inc. v. United States, 109 F.3d 753, 754-55 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(saying that Chevron is more deferential than National Muffler).
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The Tax Court seems to be particularly divided and even
more confused. In Robinson v. Commissioner, a post-Mead case
decided by the Tax Court en banc regarding general authority
Treasury regulations, the majority opinion stated that,
"[a]lthough interpretative regulations are entitled to considerable weight, they are accorded less deference than legislative
regulations, which are issued under a specific grant of authority to address a matter raised by the relevant statute."98 Yet
the court then went on, in the very next paragraph, to prescribe
Chevron's two-step analysis, citing Chevron and admonishing
that, "[i]f the administrator's reading fills a gap or defines a
term in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design, we give the administrator's judgment 'controlling weight."' 99 Moreover, despite extensive cites to National
Muffler and other pre-Chevron tax deference cases describing
the nature of its inquiry, the Tax Court's evaluation of the
regulation is indistinguishable from an opinion issued a few
months earlier by Judge Gale in Square D. Co. & Subs. v.
Commissioner, in which he applied Chevron to a specific authority Treasury regulation.100 Judge Gale concurred in Robinson by joining an opinion that did not discuss the Chevron issue, even though in Square D. he indicated that Chevron would
be appropriate for all Treasury regulations, whether issued
pursuant to general or specific authority. 101 Meanwhile, two of
the three dissenting opinions in Robinson, representing five of

98. Robinson v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 44, 68 (2002). Robinson actually called

into question the validity of certain temporary Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to the general authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000) but without
the benefit of public notice and comment. See Robinson, 119 T.C. at 66-67.
Whether temporary regulations so issued are generally entitled to Chevron
deference remains an open question. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note
43, at 906-07 (discussing the question); Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy,
Challenging Temporary Treasury Regulations:An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and Invalidity, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 248, 267-81 (2003) (same). Regardless, for purposes of its evaluation, the Tax Court in Robinson expressly equated
temporary regulations with other interpretative regulations adopted pursuant
to § 7805(a). See Robinson, 119 T.C. at 67.
99. Robinson, 119 T.C. at 68 (quoting Nationsbank of N.C. v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995)). Judge Vasquez, dissenting in
the Robinson case, observed the majority's general adherence to Chevron
analysis notwithstanding the majority's statements to the contrary. See id. at
119-20 (Vasquez, J., dissenting).
100. Compare Square D. Co. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 299, 30713 (2002), with Robinson, 119 T.C. at 69-75.
101. See Square D., 118 T.C. at 307 (citing Bankers Life, 142 F.3d 973).
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the sixteen judges participating, concluded that Skidmore, not
Chevron, provided the appropriate standard of review and that
0 2
the majority's opinion was inconsistent with that standard.
The Tax Court continued its inter-court disagreement over the
applicability of the various standards more recently in Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner.10 3 There the majority rejected Chevron deference and declined to defer to general authority Treasury regulations based on a less deferential
National Muffler analysis notwithstanding strong, separate
dissenting opinions by Judges Swift and Halpern advocating
10 4
Chevron deference.
The disagreements among the lower courts are perhaps to
be expected when one considers not only National Muffler's
muddled rhetoric but also the Supreme Court's confusing signals on the issue. The Court on several occasions has had the
opportunity to evaluate long-standing but ambiguous Treasury
regulations interpreted by the IRS through revenue rulings or
other more informal formats. Yet the Court's record of deference in such cases is all over the map, alternatively citing
Chevron or National Muffler while seemingly oblivious to the
1 05
raging debate over the relationship between the two.
D. SCHOLARLY SUGGESTIONS
Scholarly attempts to reconcile the jurisprudential mess
similarly fail to achieve consensus, and indeed render the question even more complicated than necessary. A prime example of
this is the most recent entry, which in some sense is perhaps
the most authoritative given the institution and individuals involved: the report by the American Bar Association Tax Section's Task Force on Judicial Deference, 10 6 which included such
prominent contributors to the tax deference debate as Irving

102. See Robinson, 119 T.C. at 107-08 (Swift, J., dissenting); id. at 113-21
(Vasquez, J., dissenting).
103. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. No. 6, 2006 WL
196305 (Jan.26, 2006).
104. Id.
105. Compare Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991)
(citing National Muffler), with Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,
507 U.S. 546, 575-76 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing both National Muffler and Chevron), and Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382, 387-89
(1998) (citing Chevron and applying its two-step analytical approach); see also
infra Part II.A.3.
106. See Salem et al., supra note 20.
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Salem, 10 7 Ellen Aprill, 108 and Linda Galler. 109 The Task Force
recommends Chevron deference for specific authority Treasury
regulations; but for general authority Treasury regulations, the
Task Force prescribed what they label as Chevron deference
but which closer inspection of their analysis reveals is really a
blended approach that incorporates National Muffler's multifactor analysis as the standard for reasonableness at Chevron
step two.110 In other words, the Task Force said, the Treasury's
interpretations would still be "controlling" on the courts, just
like under Chevron proper; but the range of reasonableness for
a general authority Treasury regulation would be narrower
than that for a specific authority Treasury regulation."'
Although the Task Force acknowledged that general authority Treasury regulations are properly categorized as "legislative" for APA purposes, the Task Force emphasized the "traditional and well-entrenched use of the term 'interpretive"' for
such regulations as the primary justification for this hybrid ap-

107. See, e.g., Irving Salem & Richard Bress, Agency Deference Under the
Judicial Microscope of the Supreme Court, 88 TAX NOTES 1257 (2000); Irving
Salem, Judicial Deference, Consolidated Returns, and Loss Disallowance:
Could LDR Survive a Court Challenge?, 43 TAX EXECUTIVE 167 (1991).
108. See Aprill, supra note 27; Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081 (2005) [hereinafter, Aprill, Interpretive Voice].
109. See, e.g., Linda Galler, Chevron and the Administrative Regulation of
Indexation: Challenging the Cooper Memorandum, 56 TAX NOTES 1791 (1992)
[hereinafter Galler, Chevron and Administrative Regulation]; Linda Galler,
Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L.
REV. 841 (1992); Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1995).
110. See Salem et al., supra note 20, at 737-44.
111. Ellen Aprill made a similar pre-Mead attempt to combine Chevron and
National Muffler with her "muffled Chevron" proposal. Aprill, supra note 27,
at 82-84. Aprill's proposal was premised on a perception that the Court's application of Chevron is limited largely to a textualist inquiry that ignores legislative history and is subject to a presumption that the statutory language is
plain and unambiguous. See id. at 64-67; see also Merrill, supra note 70, at
972-75 (analyzing early Chevron cases to find textualism undermining Chevron). Given National Muffler's reliance on statutory purpose and history,
Aprill suggested incorporating those elements into Chevron step-two analysis
as guides to ascertaining the reasonableness of the Treasury's interpretation
of the Code. See Aprill, Muffled Chevron, supra note 27, at 83-84. While the
Court's Chevron analysis has been inconsistent in many respects, several opinions issued since Aprill made her proposal have considered legislative history
extensively in ordinary Chevron analysis. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133-156 (2000); Regions Hosp. v. Shalala,
522 U.S. 448, 457 (1998); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845-53, 862-63 (1984) (including extensive discussion
of the Clean Air Act's legislative history).
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proach. 112 The Task Force stated that National Muffler pro113
vides "considerable guidance" for its methodology, of course;
but the Task Force also carefully parsed Chevron and Mead to
find support for its hybrid model1 14 and raised several normacautious approach to a grant of
tive justifications for taking "a
115
broad deference" in tax cases.
The National Muffler considerations of statutory language,
origin, and purpose are already incorporated in Chevron analysis, however, which leaves such factors as contemporaneity,
longevity, and consistency to be added by this modification to
Chevron step two. 1 16 Given the tendency of these latter factors
to bind an agency to one interpretation, it is difficult to see how
they are consistent with Chevron's emphasis on giving the
agency flexibility in making statutorily permissible policy
choices to address changing conditions and political administrations. Treasury's range of reasonableness would be narrowed right down to its original interpretation, or something
close to it, even if the statutory language allowed alternatives. 117 Other than the two-step organization, it is difficult to
distinguish the Task Force's proposed modified-Chevron from
National Muffler or Skidmore.
Edward Schnee and Eugene Seago offer a similar but
slightly different proposal for modifying Chevron in the tax con-

112.

Salem et al., supra note 20, at 739.

113.

Id. at 740.

114. Id. at 738-41; see also discussion infra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 723-26.
116. A common description of Chevron step one allows a reviewing court to
utilize the traditional tools of statutory construction to ascertain the statute's
plain meaning, which would include considering the statute's origin and purpose at that stage. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 nn.44-45 (2001)
(considering the statute's original purpose at Chevron step one); Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133-34; Regions Hosp., 522 U.S. at 457. Even contemporaneity may enter into Chevron analysis to the extent that an agency's contemporaneous construction of a statute may offer insight into congressional
intent. See, e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S.
294, 315 (1933) (recognizing these methodologies).
117. National Muffler involved the agency's second attempt to define business league, but that second interpretation survived in part by not being challenged for fifty years. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. Presumably the Task Force's standard would allow that regulatory interpretation
to stand; however, the Task Force offers no guidance for discerning at what
point longevity and contemporaneity would trump the sort of statutorily permissible but politically inspired policy change generally sanctioned by Chevron.
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text. Like the Task Force, Schnee and Seago concede Chevron's
applicability to specific authority Treasury regulations; but
they believe that general authority Treasury regulations should
only be given what they describe as a lesser degree of deference
premised on "reasonableness."' 118 Whereas the Court generally
uses that term interchangeably with permissibility in the Chevron context, 1 19 Schnee and Seago define their reasonableness
standard as whatever produces "the better answer for the majority of taxpayers."1 20 Yet Schnee and Seago fail to articulate
what makes one interpretation better than another. Consequently, their proposed standard would seem to require a reviewing court to make an independent judgment as to whether
the better interpretation is one that reduces (or increases)
taxes, imposes less paperwork, or appeals to more abstract notions of fairness or efficiency, even if the court's preferred policy
goals differ from those of Treasury. Indeed, it is difficult to see
how the standard Schnee and Seago propose defers to Treasury
at all.
While the Task Force and Schnee and Seago attempt to
bridge the gap between Chevron and so-called traditional tax
deference, other scholars argue more generally for the applicability of Skidmore rather than Chevron to Treasury regulations.
Mitchell Gans interprets Mead to mean that Chevron applies to
both specific authority and general authority Treasury regulations, but for normative reasons he advocates legislation expressly adopting Skidmore respect as the more appropriate
standard for the latter.1 21 John Coverdale applies the frame118. See Edward J. Schnee & W. Eugene Seago, Deference Issues in the Tax
Law: Mead Clarifies the Chevron Rule-Or Does It?, 96 J. TAX'N 366, 371-72
(2002).
119. The Court in Chevron seemed to use "reasonable" and "permissible" or
derivations thereof interchangeably. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). In subsequent cases, the Court
seemed to use one or the other in connection with Chevron step two, but offered no hint that it regards the terms as anything other than synonymous in
that context. Compare, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (articulating step two as "when the statute 'is silent or ambiguous' we must defer
to a reasonable construction by the agency charged with its implementation"),
with Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002) (describing step two as
"whether the interpretation, for other reasons, exceeds the bounds of the permissible").
120. Schnee & Seago, supra note 118, at 372.
121. See Gans, supra note 20, at 792-93. Peter Lowy and Juan Vasquez,
Jr., similarly imply in their analysis of deference and revenue rulings that
Treasury regulations would be entitled to Chevron deference under Mead, but
they do not discuss the issue outright. See Lowy & Vasquez, supra note 29, at
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work of Chevron, Skidmore, and Mead to conclude that specific
authority Treasury regulations warrant Chevron deference
while general authority Treasury regulations qualify only for
Skidmore respect. 122 Coverdale also has expressed his preference for what he identifies as traditional tax deference principles for both types of regulations: controlling deference through
an inquiry that collapses Chevron's two steps into one for specific authority Treasury regulations, and National Muffler or
(which Coverdale equates) for general auSkidmore respect
123
thority ones.
To some degree, these scholarly efforts all build upon different understandings of the Chevron doctrine; and the diverse
conceptions of Chevron necessarily lead to inconsistent conclusions concerning how the Chevron doctrine should apply in the
tax context.124 That aspect of these analyses merely reflects the
more general scholarly disagreement over what Chevron
means. These disparate approaches to tax deference are consistent, however, in their insistence that, whatever Chevron may
mean for other areas of the law, tax is different and should be
treated thus.
II. THE CASE AGAINST THE NATIONAL MUFFLER
"ALTERNATIVE"
As noted, the arguments for alternative, tax-specific deference standards for tax cases fall roughly into two categories:
one doctrinal, resting on the belief that tax has its own deference tradition that should and perhaps does trump Chevron;
and the other normative, based on various claims that tax is
unique among regulatory fields. In truth, however, neither
claim is accurate.
A. COMPARING THE DOCTRINAL HISTORY

The Court has a long history of deference toward Treasury
regulations that not only pre-dates Chevron but extends back to
the origins of the modern income tax. The Court also has an
equally long pre-Chevron tradition of judicial deference toward

232-33.
122. See John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: JudicialReview of
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings after Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39,
81-83 (2003).
123. See Coverdale, supra note 14, at 54-55, 67-68.
124. Cf. supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
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agency legal interpretations generally. The questions as-yet
unexamined are whether and how these conventions are related. Tracing the history of judicial deference in both tax and
non-tax cases turns up more similarities than differences.
1.

Early Assumptions

The rise of the administrative state in the early twentieth
century yielded tremendous tension between the executive
branch and independent administrative agencies on the one
hand and the judicial branch on the other over questions of
statutory interpretation. 125 Agencies bring special resources
and expertise to the task of administering the complicated
regulatory schemes enacted by Congress; but the courts are
also experts at statutory interpretation, and Marbury v. Madison clearly established the Court as the primary interpreter of
12 6
the law.
Giving executive branch and independent agencies extensive authority to adopt legally binding regulations is largely a
twentieth-century phenomenon. Many non-tax statutes enacted
in the Progressive and New Deal Eras granted rulemaking authority to executive branch and independent agencies. 127 Some
such authorizations were narrow and specific: for example, giving a specific agency like the Interstate Commerce Commission
or the Federal Power Commission the power to impose uniform
accounting rules for an industry whose rates were regulated
and who consequently had to file annual reports of their assets,
income, and expenses. 128 Other grants of authority were broad

125. See Edward Clark Lukens, The Delegation of Power-A Neglected
ConstitutionalQuestion, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 367, 367 (1935); Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079-82 (1990).

126. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see also Thomas W.
Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law Decision,
37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 496 (2004) ("The tradition in administrative law
is that Marbury stands foursquare for the proposition that courts must engage
in de novo or independent review of all questions of law."); Sunstein, supra
note 125, at 2080 (acknowledging the same).
127. See generally John A. Fairlie, Administrative Legislation, 18 MICH. L.
REV. 181, 183-88 (1920) (cataloguing early examples); Merrill & Watts, supra
note 48, at 495-98 (discussing early statutes).
128. See, e.g., Federal Power Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 847,
854 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 825(a) (2000)) (giving the FPC such authority);
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 220, 48 Stat. 1064, 1078-80 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 220 (2000)) (giving the same to the FCC); Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104, § 20, 24 Stat. 379, amended by Hepburn Act of
1906, ch. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 593-95 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
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and general, giving agencies the power to adopt rules and regulations as they deemed necessary to effectuate the statutes they

administered. 129
Some of the very earliest of the modern income tax statutes
granted both specific and general rulemaking authority to the
Secretary of the Treasury and, under him, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. The Revenue Act of 1916 introduced a few
specific rulemaking grants. 130 Subsequent tax statutes included
those and added more. 131 The War Revenue Act of 1917 additionally introduced the predecessor to I.R.C. § 7805(a) allowing
the promulgation of "all necessary rules and regulations for the
enforcement" of the Act. 132
During this early period of regulatory expansion, non-tax
commentators discussed at length the extent to which the Constitution permitted Congress to delegate the authority to
promulgate binding, substantive regulations without violating
the nondelegation doctrine. 133 In cases addressing a wide range
of administrative actions, such as Buttfield v. Stranahan3 4 and
United States v. Grimaud135 the Supreme Court repeatedly de-

tions of 49 U.S.C.) (granting the same to the ICC).
129. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.
75-717, § 701, 52 Stat. 1040, 1055-58 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 371 (2000));
Communications Act of 1934 § 4(i).
130. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, ch. 463, §§ 5(a)(8),
6(a)(7), 12(a)(2), 12(b)(2), 39 Stat. 756, 757 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. (2000)) (authorizing regulations providing reasonable depletion allowances for oil and gas wells and mines); id. §§ 8(g), 13(d) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2000)) (authorizing regulations
establishing permissible accounting methods other than "actual receipts and
disbursements").
131. See Ellsworth C. Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil
Case, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 252, 258 (1940) (identifying fifty-six specific authority
delegations in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939); Fred T. Field, The Legal
Force and Effect of Treasury Interpretation, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 91,
95-96 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921) (listing specific authority grants found
in the Revenue Act of 1918).
132. See War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 71-77 (2000)).
133. See, e.g., John B. Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27
YALE L.J. 892 (1918); Fairlie, supra note 127, at 189; Lee, supra note 23, at 23; John D. McGowen, An Economic Interpretationof the Doctrine of Delegation
of Governmental Powers, 12 TUL. L. REV. 179 (1938).
134. 192 U.S. 470, 494 (1904) (upholding a statute delegating to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to "fix and establish uniform standards of
purity, quality and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into
the United States").
135. 220 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1911) (upholding the Forest Reserve Act's dele-
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clined to characterize even broad delegations of authority to
adopt binding regulations as unconstitutional delegations of
legislative power. 136 Yet the New Deal cases of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 137 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,138 which in 1935 struck down provisions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, 139 offered proof that at least some
delegations of legislative authority were unconstitutional.
Although the Court almost always upheld congressional
delegations of rulemaking authority on one ground or another, 140 the Court's rhetoric in its nondelegation jurisprudence
strongly influenced the scholarly characterization of regulations and their relative legal weight. Scholars and practitioners
of that period who surveyed the Court's nondelegation cases
generally agreed that Congress could constitutionally delegate
the authority to promulgate binding regulations, so long as the
grant to do so was narrow and specific. 14' Regulations promulgated pursuant to such specific authority created "new law,"
carried the force and effect of law, and were deemed legislative
in character. 142
gation to the Secretary of Agriculture the broad authority to protect national
forests and to impose criminal penalties for violating such regulations).
136. See also, e.g., Kan. City So. Ry. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423, 443
(1913) (upholding a Hepburn Act provision giving the ICC discretion over accounting rules for railroads); St. Louis & Iron Mountain Ry. v. Taylor, 210
U.S. 281, 287 (1908) (upholding a Safety Appliance Act provision delegating to
the ICC authority to certify certain freight car standards).
137. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
138. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
139. See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 432, A.L.A. Schechter, 295 U.S. at
541-42.
140. Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry are the only two cases in
which the Court has rejected congressional delegations of power to regulatory
agencies as unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds. See PIERCE, supra
note 23, § 2.6, at 91.
141. See 1 F. TROWBRIDGE VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 489 (1942); Fairlie, supra note 127, at 189-97; Lee, supra note 23, at 2-3,
21-25.

142. See, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920) (describing such regulations as having "the force and effect of law if [they] be not
in conflict with express statutory provision"). Both tax and non-tax commentators recognized this definition of legislative regulations. See Alvord, supra note
131, at 259-60; Brown, supra note 23, at 384-85; Davis, supra note 23, at 92829; Lee, supra note 23, at 2-3; see also Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States,
316 U.S. 407, 416-22 (1942) (recognizing the legal force of specific authority
regulations). In their analysis of congressional intent and the force of law,
Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts downplay the role of the nondelegation doctrine and emphasize the importance of penalties as evidence of congressional intent that regulations carry the force and effect of law. See Merrill
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By contrast, so-called interpretative regulations adopted
pursuant to more general rulemaking grants of the "all necessary rules and regulations" variety merely interpreted existing
law, so could not carry such legal effect. 14 3 A general rulemaking grant that authorized binding regulations carrying the force
and effect of law would be inconsistent with the nondelegation
doctrine and thus constitutionally invalid. 144 By contrast, nonbinding regulations reflecting administrative officials' best
guess of a statute's meaning were merely exercises of executive
power and did not require congressionally delegated authority. 145 The Administrative Procedure Act, adopted in 1946 to reform and bring uniformity to federal administrative process,
implicitly incorporated these general principles in requiring
procedures including public notice and opportunity for comment for legislative regulations but not for interpretative
146
ones.
Adhering to this analytical model, both tax and non-tax
commentators considered Treasury's specific authority regulations to be legislative but its general authority regulations to be
& Watts, supra note 48, at 488-92. They acknowledge, however, that Progressive- and New Deal-Era courts and commentators showed no recognition of
that convention. See id. at 503. Accordingly, the congressional convention
Merrill and Watts identify is not inconsistent with my argument that the
common understanding of the period required a specific authority grant before
a regulation could be characterized as legislative and treated as binding on
regulated parties as well as the government.
143. See, e.g., VOM BAUR, supra note 141, § 489; Alvord, supra note 131, at
260-61; Davis, supra note 23, at 928-29; Stanley S. Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U.
PA. L. REV. 556, 557-58 (1940).
144. See, e.g., Alvord, supra note 131, at 260-61; Surrey, supra note 143, at
557-58.
145. See, e.g., Fairlie, supra note 127, at 189; Surrey, supra note 143, at
558.
146. The Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative ProcedureAct,
generally considered the authoritative history of that statute, is consistent
with this understanding. The Manual defines legislative regulations (which it
calls "substantive rules") as "rules, other than organizational or procedural .... issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and which implement the statute." U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL
ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 23, 30 n.3 (1947). The Manual offers
as examples of such regulations the Federal Power Commission's rules prescribing uniform systems of accounts and the SEC's proxy rules, both of which,
the Manual notes, carry the force and effect of law. See id. By contrast, the
Manual defines as interpretative regulations (which it and the APA both call
"interpretative rules") as "rules or statements issued by an agency to advise
the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers." See id.
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merely interpretative and nonbinding on nondelegation
grounds. 147 As observed by Kenneth Culp Davis, however,
"[a]lthough the theoretical distinction between legislative and
interpretative rules is often clear, the practice does not always
follow the theory, and in the borderland between the two kinds
of rules, the differences, if any, are sometimes obscured or ignored." 148 Davis offered as one example certain general authority Treasury regulations interpreting the vague, one-sentence
definition of "gross income" in what is now I.R.C. § 61.149
Nevertheless, at least in theory, the implications of categorizing a regulation as legislative or interpretative were marked
when it came to judicial review. The Court made clear in nontax cases like Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Scarlett 150 and AT&T v. United States151 that, so long as the delegation was constitutionally valid, reviewing courts must uphold
legislative regulations unless it was clear that the agency exceeded the scope of its rulemaking authority. 15 2 In such cases,
said the Court, "This court is not at liberty to substitute its own
discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept
within the bounds of their administrative powers."1 53 The
courts regularly applied this "controlling deference" standard in
reviewing specific authority Treasury regulations as well. 154
147. See, e.g., Alvord, supra note 131, at 259-61; Davis, supra note 23, at
930; Lee, supra note 23, at 2; Surrey, supra note 143, at 557-58.
148. Davis, supra note 23, at 932.
149. See id. at 933-34 ("That the regulations are intended to be merely interpretative along with the bulk of other tax regulations seems beyond doubt.
Yet they are clearly designed to make bold and abrupt changes in the law.");
see also I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000) (defining gross income as "all income from whatever source derived" including but not limited to several listed items).
150. 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937).
151. 299 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1936).
152. The same principle of controlling deference applied as well where an
agency exercised a specific authority grant through formal-adjudication processes. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) ("But where
the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited."); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402,
412 (1941) ("Where, as here, a determination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and the administrative conclusion
left untouched.").
153. AT&T, 299 U.S. at 236-37; see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.,
300 U.S. at 474; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 134, 141
(1932); Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423, 447 (1913); VOM
BAUR, supra note 141, §§ 497, 499 (recognizing this standard); Davis, supra
note 23, at 929 (same); Lee, supra note 23, at 29 (same).
154. See, e.g., Comm'r v. S. Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 503 (1948) (con-
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In both non-tax and tax cases involving interpretative
regulations, by contrast, the strong deference applicable to legislative regulations did not apply. Instead, the Court reviewed
interpretative regulations independently, but offered a variety
of factors such as contemporaneity, longevity, and consistency
that, where present, justified giving agency interpretations respect. 155 Subject-matter complexity and comparative institutional expertise also played a role. 156 Ultimately, the Court
wrote the oft-quoted passage in Skidmore that has become the
dominant articulation of this multifactor standard.157 Although
Skidmore, like Chevron, was not a tax case, the Court in
Skidmore analogized the Wage and Hour Division rulings at issignaling that
sue to general authority Treasury regulations,
1
the same standard should apply to both. 58
Again comparing actual practice to theory, Kenneth Culp
sidering a broad, specific authority grant as the reason why a regulation
"should not be overruled by the courts unless clearly contrary to the will of
Congress"); Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 103 (1939) (describing
the subject of specific authority regulation as "for the Congress and the Commissioner"); Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931) (describing a specific authority regulation as "valid unless unreasonable or inconsistent with the statute"); see also Pictoral Review Co. v. Helvering, 68 F.2d
766, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (applying a strong deference standard); Hamill v.
Comm'r, 30 BTA 955, 958 (1934) (same); Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of
the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 398, 401 (1941) (discussing judicial
review of specific authority Treasury regulations).
155. See, e.g., Burnet v. Chi. Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1,16 (1932) (acknowledging that consistency is given great weight); Mason v. Routzahn, 275 U.S.
175, 178 (1927) (deferring to contemporaneous and long-standing Treasury
practice embodied in regulations); see also United States v. Pleasants, 305
U.S. 357, 363 (1939) (declining to defer to a regulation inconsistently followed
by the IRS); Griswold, supra note 154, at 404-11 (discussing the role of contemporaneousness and "long-continuedness" in giving interpretative Treasury
regulations a legally binding effect).
156. See, e.g., California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 584 (1944) (emphasizing the U.S. Maritime Commission's expertise in interpreting the Shipping
Act); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 607
(1942) (deferring to the Federal Power Commission's "highly expert judgment"
regarding the Natural Gas Act); Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39, 52
(1939) (acknowledging IRS expertise concerning the I.R.C.); Chi., Rock Island
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 95 (1931) (deferring to the Interstate Commerce Commission as "a body of trained and experienced experts");
see also Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 398 (1940) (declining to defer
to Treasury regulations interpreting the National Industrial Recovery Act that
"have not been consistent in their interpretation of the statute and do not embody the results of any specialized departmental knowledge or experience").
157. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also supra
notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
158. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
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Davis in particular noted that the authoritative weight of interpretative rules varied considerably at the hands of courts
weighing these factors. 159 Within the general range of potential
outcomes, complexity and expertise likely explain the courts'
propensity to give general authority Treasury regulations as a
class slightly more deference than similar rules issued by other
agencies. 160 That tendency did not, however, rise to the level of
a unique standard of review. 161 Instead, the Court regularly
applied Skidmore and/or its multifactor approach to evaluate
interpretative regulations in tax and non-tax cases alike, but
162
with one important practical distinction in terms of outcome.
Early in the first half of the twentieth century, the Court
advocated a strong version of what is known as the reenactment doctrine. 163 Under this doctrine, interpretative regulations that were contemporaneously adopted could become binding and carry the force of law if Congress reenacted the statute
without substantially altering the regulation. 164 The Court's
application of the reenactment doctrine was not limited to tax
cases; 165 but the ability of congressional reenactment to move
159.

See Davis, supra note 23, at 934-43 (discussing judicial review of in-

terpretative regulations generally and Treasury regulations specifically).
160. See id. at 934-35 (noting a trend of giving Treasury regulations significant deference).
161. See id.; see also Griswold, supra note 154, at 404-11 (emphasizing the
importance of contemporaneity and longevity in evaluating general authority
Treasury regulations).
162. Compare FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S.
27, 37 (1981) (applying Skidmore to non-tax regulation), and Adamo Wrecking
Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 n.5 (1978) (same), with United States
v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 127 & n.11 (1963) (applying Skidmore to a general authority Treasury regulation).
163. See Brown, supra note 23, at 378-83. But see Helvering v. Wilshire Oil
Co., 308 U.S. 90, 99-101 (1939) (suggesting limitations on the reenactment
doctrine's applicability); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936) (rejecting a long-standing Treasury regulation where the Court deemed the statute unambiguous).
164. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Wheeler, 324 U.S. 542, 546-47 n.10 (1945); Douglas v. Comm'r, 322 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1944); Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114-15 (1939); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 8283 (1938); Hartley v. Comm'r, 295 U.S. 216, 220 (1935); United States v. Dakota-Mont. Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459, 466 (1933); see also Brown, supra note 23, at
399-404 (noting and criticizing the practice); Randolph E. Paul, Use and
Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction,49 YALE L.J. 660, 664-65
(1940) (same).
165. See, e.g., Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932) (giving
"great weight" to a Department of Labor regulation predating congressional
reenactment); Nat'l Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146 (1920) (calling reenactment "an implied legislative recognition and approval of the execu-
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an interpretative regulation into the legislative category had
important consequences in the tax context.
For the first few decades of the federal income tax, whenever Congress chose to alter the income tax provisions significantly, which it did every few years, Congress did so by reenacting the entire statute rather than merely enacting
amendments. 166 Although the common understanding was that
general authority Treasury regulations were interpretative and
nonbinding, the Court's adherence to a strong form of the reenactment doctrine through the 1930s meant that an entire generation of general authority regulations was given virtually
automatic legislative characterization, and consequently the
167
force and effect of law, on reenactment doctrine grounds.
Several prominent tax commentators found this conclusion
troubling and, in an effort to move general authority Treasury
regulations back into the interpretative category, voiced additional justifications for distinguishing general from specific authority Treasury regulations. 168 One thought was that Treasury
did not need specific authority to adopt interpretative regulations in light of the general authority grant, so by including
both types of authority in the various Revenue Acts, Congress
must be signaling its intent that the specific authority regulations be legislative and the general authority regulations be interpretative in character. 169 Regardless of the merits of these
arguments relative to the original nondelegation basis for distinguishing the two types of Treasury regulations, the goal was
to counter the impact of the reenactment doctrine to bring tax
deference in line with general norms, not vice versa.
In tax and non-tax cases both, the Court's adherence to its
own standards for reviewing legislative and interpretative
tive construction of the statute"); United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compafiia, 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1908) ("[T]he reenactment by Congress, without
change, of a statute which had previously received long-continued executive
construction, is an adoption by Congress of such construction."); United States
v. G. Falk & Bros., 204 U.S. 143, 152 (1907) (expressing same).
166. It was not until 1939 that Congress restructured the various existing
tax laws into a single Internal Revenue Code and began making regular
changes by merely amending that Code. See BITTKER, supra note 1, 1.1.5;
Alvord, supra note 131, at 263.
167. See Paul, supra note 164, at 664 ("Our tax laws are reenacted so repeatedly that this [reenactment] rule is invoked more often than the general
statement as to the validity of regulations standing alone.").
168. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 23, at 384-86; Griswold, supra note 154,
at 400-01, 411-13; Surrey, supra note 143, at 557-59.
169. See Surrey, supra note 143, at 558.
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regulations was frequently inconsistent. 1 70 Reviewing the
Court's jurisprudence from the first half of the twentieth century, one can find references to contemporaneity, longevity, and
17
reenactment in cases involving specific authority regulations '
and reliance on specific authority precedents in cases involving
general authority regulations. 172 The excessive intrusion of the
reenactment doctrine in tax cases only makes those cases even
more difficult to reconcile coherently. Regardless, the jurisprudence from this period does not distinguish between tax and
non-tax on the issue of judicial deference; and the scholarship
likewise is remarkably consistent regarding the distinction between specific and general authority regulations and the theoretical ramifications for judicial review. In sum, the comparative analysis of this period does not support the existence of a
unique tax deference tradition.
2.

The Road to Chevron

A significant strain of the Court's jurisprudence continued
to counsel different deference standards for specific authority/legislative regulations as opposed to general authority/interpretative regulations right up until the Court's decision
in Chevron.173 In 1977, in Batterton v. Francis, the Court
evaluated a challenge to a legislative regulation promulgated
by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare pursuant to
a specific authority grant in the Social Security Act and, in so
doing, articulated deference standards fully consistent with the
early understandings. 1 74 The Court stated, "In exercising [the
expressly delegated power to prescribe standards interpreting a
statutory term], the Secretary adopts regulations with legislative effect. A reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations simply because it would have interpreted the statute in
a different manner."'175 The Court then noted, "By way of con170. See Davis, supra note 23, at 934 ("Courts frequently give as much effect to interpretative rules as to legislative rules, and courts frequently find
ways to set aside legislative rules.").
171. See, e.g., Comm'r v. S. Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948);
Burnet v. Sav. & Loan Bldg. Corp., 288 U.S. 406, 415 (1933); Fawcus Mach.
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931).
172. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Wheeler, 324 U.S. 542, 547 n.10 (1945) (citing
Fawcus Mach., 282 U.S. 375).
173.

See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.8,

7.13 (2d ed. 1979); Merrill, supra note 70, at 973.
174. See 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977).
175. Id. at 425.
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trast, a court is not required to give effect to an interpretative
regulation. Varying degrees of deference are accorded to administrative interpretations, based on such factors as the timing
and consistency of the agency's position, and the nature of its
176
expertise."
Subsequently, in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the Court considered at length whether certain voluntary disclosure regulations issued by the Department of Labor's Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs constituted "law" for purposes
of the Trade Secrets Act. 177 Recognizing the distinction between
legislative and interpretative regulations in the APA's legislative history, the Court focused its inquiry on whether Congress
had delegated to the agency the requisite legislative authority
to act in such a manner. 178 The only congressional authority
grant the OFCCP could identify in support of its regulations
was a general authority provision known as the "housekeeping
statute," which gives the heads of executive branch agencies
general authority to issue procedural regulations governing
employee behavior, record retention, and other general departmental business performance matters.1 79 Recognizing the
APA's distinction between legislative and interpretative rules,
the Court found the general authority grant in the housekeeping statute inadequate to support legally binding, legislative
regulations.18 0 In dicta, the Court quoted Batterton v. Francis
also for the proposition that the appropriate evaluative standard for such regulations would be the multifactor analysis
represented by Skidmore and its predecessors and progeny. 8 1

176. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265,
274-75 (1982) (articulating the same strong deference standard for specific
authority regulations); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981)
(same).
177. See 441 U.S. 281, 295-316 (1979).
178. Id. at 302.
179. Id. at 308-09 (citing the housekeeping statute, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)).
The OFCCP also offered as authority for its regulations another Department
of Labor regulation and a presidential Executive Order, neither of which the
Court considered representative of congressional delegation. See Chrysler, 441
U.S. at 303-08.
180. See id. at 314-16. The Court left open the possibility that some general authority grants might support legislative regulations, but then said
without elaboration that the statute must show at least that Congress contemplated the regulations at issue. Id. at 308. Separately, the Court considered relevant the agency's failure to utilize notice-and-comment rulemaking in
promulgating the regulations at issue. See id. at 313-15.
181. Id. at 315.
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Other non-tax opinions issued by the Court during this period similarly emphasized the legislative or interpretative
character of the source of the agency authority behind the regulations under consideration.18 2 Likewise in the tax area. In
Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States, the Court considered
the validity of general authority Treasury regulations interpreting the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) provisions of the
Code.1 83 Citing Batterton v. Francis among other cases, the
Court made clear that it was applying a less deferential review
standard because Treasury relied on the general authority
grant of I.R.C. § 7805(a) rather than more specific authority in
promulgating the regulation.184 By contrast, "[w]here the
Commissioner acts under specific authority, our primary inquiry is whether the interpretation or method is within the
85
delegation of authority."'
Despite the Court's expressions of continued commitment
to these long-standing principles, it was during this period that
weaknesses in the old approach became more problematic. The
1960s and 1970s saw a virtual explosion of agency rulemaking,
with agencies seeking to achieve more policy objectives through
general authority regulations. l8 6 Traditional doctrine treated
182. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981) (citing
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977), in support of strong deference
due to Congress's explicit delegation to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services of authority over the Medicaid statute); United States v. Clark, 445
U.S. 23, 33-34 n.10 (1980) (citing Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425 n.9, in discussing
the contemporaneity of, and declining to defer to, an informal Civil Service
Commission interpretation of the Civil Service Retirement Act); see also Arthur Earl Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participationin the
Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the
A.P.A., 23 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 108-17 (1970) (citing earlier cases for the same
dichotomy).
183. 452 U.S. 247, 248 (1981).
184. Id. at 253.
185. Id.
186. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 23, § 1.6; Clark Byse, Vermont Yankee and
the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1823, 1823 (1978); Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 546-49.
Pierce traces the dramatic rise in rulemaking activity to several factors including the enactment of several new federal statutes in the mid- to late-1960s
that delegated rulemaking authorities to new or existing agencies. See PIERCE,
supra. Pierce also points to the Court's decisions in United States v. Florida
East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), and Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), which
largely replaced formal rulemaking with informal rulemaking as the norm and
precluded judges from imposing procedural requirements beyond those ex-
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general authority rulemaking as interpretative, nonbinding,
and not entitled to controlling deference.1 8 7 Modern practice,
however, involved agencies increasingly utilizing general rulemaking grants to choose among alternative reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes and defending their interpretive choices in such terms.18 8 Meanwhile, since the Court never
again invalidated a delegation of power to an agency on nondelegation grounds after PanamaRefining and Schechter Poultry, that doctrine faded as a limitation on congressional delega18 9
tion of rulemaking authority.
Both tax and non-tax opinions from this period reflect this
tension. The lower courts addressed the expansion of rulemaking activity by characterizing many general authority regulations as legislative rather than interpretative based on what
the regulations did rather than the source of their authority.1 90
The Court likewise indicated more concern for the distinction
between legislative and interpretative regulations and the consequences for both the APA's procedural requirements and judicial deference. 19 1 In a few cases, the Court even made clear
that it was evaluating regulations, as interpretative rather
pressed in APA § 553 upon informal rulemaking efforts. See PIERCE, supra.
187. See supra Part II.A.1.
188. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.3 (3d ed.
1991) (noting a rise in rulemaking); Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 549-70
(documenting efforts by the Federal Trade Commission, Food and Drug Administration, and National Labor Relations Board to claim previously unasserted legislative authority).
189. See PIERCE, supra note 186, § 2.6, at 91-93; see also 1 KENNETH CULP
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.2 (2d ed. 1978) (describing nondelegation as a failed legal doctrine); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW § 12 (1976) (opining that the nondelegation doctrine "can not be taken
literally").
190. See, e.g., Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688,
697 (2d Cir. 1975) (concluding that FDA regulations issued pursuant to general authority were nonetheless legislative because they were legally binding);
see also 2 DAVIS, supra note 173, §§ 7.13, 7.15 (reflecting the change from prior
understanding by noting that "[i]nterpretative rules sometimes have force of
law and sometimes [do] not," and documenting lower court blurring of the distinction between legislative and interpretative regulations); Michael Asimow,
Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 393401 (discussing various tests for distinguishing legislative and interpretative
regulations, and noting the declining relevance of the specific versus general
authority distinction).
191. See, e.g., Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 252-53
(1981); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 517 n.13 (1981);
Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295-316 (1979); Batterton v. Francis, 432
U.S. 416, 425-26 n.9 (1977); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-42
(1976); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235-36 (1974).
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than legislative, and thus using the Skidmore-type multifactor
review standard, at the insistence of the parties. 192 Oral argument transcripts in such cases include passages in which the
Justices suggest to the litigants that the regulations at issue
might be legislative instead, only to be rebuffed by attorneys
193
relying on the traditional definitions of those categories.
Notwithstanding fairly evident interest by the Court, the parties before it simply would not take the hint.
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. offers a particularly
good example of such behavior. 194 Alessi involved an interpretation of I.R.C. § 411, issued pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a) general
authority through notice-and-comment rulemaking, as applied
195
in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act context.
With extensive discussion, the Third Circuit determined that
the regulation at issue was "plainly legislative in nature" and
used a controlling-deference review standard. 196 In an amicus
brief filed with the Court, however, the government rejected
that characterization even as it defended the regulation as an
interpretive choice delegated to Treasury and the IRS by Congress.197 At oral argument, when the Court inquired as to
Treasury's regulatory authority, attorneys for both parties declined to defend the Third Circuit's view. 198 Since neither party
cared to challenge the government's characterization of the

192. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 & n.15 (1980);
Alessi, 451 U.S. at 517 n.13.
193. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Alessi, 451 U.S. 504 (Nos. 791943, 80-193), 1981 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 75, at *2-3; Transcript of Oral Argument, Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. 1 (No. 78-1870), 1980 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 9, at
*4-8.
194. 451 U.S. 504.
195. Id. at 517-18. ERISA is a complicated statute that governs employee
pension and welfare plans. Although most of the statute falls within Department of Labor jurisdiction, the Secretary of the Treasury has regulatory authority over certain ERISA provisions incorporated into the Internal Revenue
Code. See, e.g., 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions § 3 (2005) (describing the ERISA
statute); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 89-96 (3d ed. 2000) (same).
196. Buczynski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (3d Cir.
1980). Buczynski and Alessi are the names of two different cases that were
consolidated on appeal. At the Third Circuit, the cases were consolidated under the Buczynski name, while at the Supreme Court, the cases are consolidated under the Alessi name. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 504.
197. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 19 n.12, Alessi,
451 U.S. 504 (Nos. 79-1943, 80-193), 1981 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1079, *28
n.12.
198. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 193 at *2-3, *27-28.
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regulation, the Court disregarded the Third Circuit's analysis,
treated the regulation as interpretative, and reviewed it under
the multifactor review standard for interpretative rules. 199
The Court's opinions from this period also demonstrate an
increasingly deferential characterization of the Skidmore-style
multifactor analysis, particularly where the interpretative rule
in question was a regulation as opposed to a less formal format.
I previously described National Muffler's analysis as "perplexing" for its combination of Chevron-style and Skidmore-style
rhetoric. 2 00 The same is true of the two cases routinely cited for
the proposition that general authority Treasury regulations are
entitled to "less deference" than specific authority ones, Rowan
Cos. Inc. v. Commissioner and United States v. Vogel Fertilizer
Co.201 In both, the Court expressly made such a statement and

cited National Muffler as providing the evaluative standard for
challenges to the validity of general authority Treasury regulations. 20 2 Yet the Court's opinions in both cases also contain
Chevron-like concepts, speaking of such regulations as valid so
long as "they 'implement the congressional mandate in some
reasonable manner,"' 203 and stating that "[a] Treasury Regulation is not invalid simply because the statutory language will
20 4
support a contrary interpretation."
The Court's articulation of its deference principles in the
years leading up to Chevron was often similarly muddled in
non-tax cases as well. For example, in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, a case involving an Occupational Safety and Health Act
regulation adopted pursuant to a general rulemaking grant
similar to I.R.C. § 7805(a), the Court identified the regulation
as interpretative according to the Secretary of Labor's characterization, said that the Skidmore standard governed, but described that standard as whether the regulation
constitutes a permissible gloss on the Act by the Secretary, in light of
the Act's language, structure, and legislative history. Our inquiry is
informed by an awareness that the regulation is entitled to deference

199. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 517-18 n.13 (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432
U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977), and other sources).
200. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
201. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); Rowan Cos.,
Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
202. See Vogel Fertilizer,455 U.S. at 24-25; Rowan Cos., 452 U.S. at 253.
203. Rowan Cos., 452 U.S. at 252 (quoting United States v. Correll, 389
U.S. 299, 307 (1967)); see also Vogel Fertilizer,455 U.S. at 24 (quoting same).
204. Vogel Fertilizer,455 U.S. at 26.
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unless it can be said not to be a reasoned and supportable interpreta20 5
tion of the Act.

The Court could have resolved the tension between traditional deference standards and expanded rulemaking activity
by following the lead of the circuit courts and acknowledging
the legislative character of many general authority regulations. 206 There is little evidence, however, that the Court ever
contemplated resolving its concerns about the deference applicable to general authority regulations this way. 20

7

Instead, the

Court offered Chevron, expanding the applicability of strong
deference to implicit as well as explicit delegations and, subsequently, Mead, limiting Chevron's scope to agency action carrying the force of law.
3.

Post-ChevronConsiderations

The general consensus is that the Court did not intend to
announce a major shift in its deference doctrine with Chevron.208 Other scholars have ably demonstrated that the Court's
application of Chevron across the administrative law spectrum
was inconsistent at best during its first decade, with the Court
reaching independent decisions without mentioning Chevron in
many cases in which deference was arguably appropriate. 20 9 In
fact, the Court did not cite Chevron any more often in the doc-

205. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980).
206. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
207. In Chrysler v. Brown, the Court alluded to the legal-effects test for distinguishing between legislative and interpretative rules. See 441 U.S. 281, 302
(1981) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232, 235-36 (1974)). Since then,
however, the Court has not articulated any alternative for distinguishing between legislative and interpretative regulations other than the source of authority. The only two cases addressing the issue, Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 99-100 (1995), and Thomas Jefferson University v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512-18 (1994), involved 5-4 decisions and offered
mostly unhelpful, conclusory statements as to the character of the rules at issue.
208. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court:
Highlights from the Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.)
10,606, 10,613 (1993) (analyzing Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers to conclude that the Justices did not focus on the broader implications of the Chevron opinion); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 838 (discussing
how Chevron first achieved prominence in the lower courts).
209. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 70, at 980-85 (reviewing and performing
empirical surveys and arguing that Chevron did not actually result in increased Supreme Court deference to agency interpretations); Russell L.
Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 MO. L. REV. 129, 131 (1993) (suggesting that "Chevron's importance has been exaggerated").
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trine's second decade than in the first.2 10 Nevertheless, the

lower courts rely heavily on Chevron,2 11 and when the Court
acts in a deferential mode, it typically speaks in terms of Chevron and, in the last few years, Mead and Skidmore.212
But not always. In the tax context, as noted above, the
Court has been woefully inconsistent in what, if any, deference
doctrine it intends to apply. Since deciding Chevron, the Court
has cited National Muffler and Chevron each twice in majority
opinions, and it has cited National Muffler three times to Chev2 13
ron's two in separate concurring or dissenting opinions.
Once, in Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. Commissioner, Justice
Souter, writing in dissent, cited both Chevron and National
Muffler in the same passage for general deference proposi14
tions. 2
Post-Chevron, the Court cites National Muffler most routinely for the proposition that courts should defer to Treasury
regulations that reasonably interpret the Code, 215 an unre210. Though hardly a careful analysis of the Court's application of Chevron,
a quick Westlaw search demonstrated that the Court cited Chevron 86 times
from the day it was decided in June 1984 through June 1994, but only 74
times from October 1994 through June 2004. Additionally, there are four postMead cases through the 2003-2004 Term in which the Court cited Mead
and/or Skidmore but not Chevron. Search of WESTLAW (April 21, 2006).
211. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental
Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9-10 (2005) (describing empirical research).
212. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699-2711 (2005); Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536,
1546-49 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716, 736
(2005) (Thomas, J. dissenting); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
542 U.S. 241, 269 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Household Credit Serv., Inc.
v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004); Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 24 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581,
600 (2004); Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487
(2004); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003).
213. Compare Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546,
576 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron), and United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same), with United
Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 840 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing National Muffler); Comm'r v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93,
120, 127 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring and Scalia, J., dissenting) (same),
and Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 576 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same).
214. See Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 576 (Souter, J., dissenting).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S.
200, 219 (2001); Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. at 120; Newark Morning Ledger,
507 U.S. at 575-76 (Souter, J., dissenting); Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499
U.S. 554, 560-61 (1990); see also Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S.
212, 222 (1989) (citing National Muffler for such a proposition in connection
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markable pronouncement under any of Mead, Chevron, or
Skidmore.2 16 The Court similarly cites Chevron regularly in
non-tax cases for the mere point that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of the statutes they administer. 217 In one non-tax case, Meyer v. Holley, the Court even cited

both Chevron and Skidmore for the statement that "the Court
ordinarily defers to an administering agency's reasonable
statutory interpretation."2 18 Carefully reading the Court's language can be illuminating at times, but in post-Chevron tax
cases, the Court's reliance on National Muffler for this point is
best characterized as deference boilerplate. By way of comparison, the Court regularly cites non-tax pre-Chevron cases like
Batterton v. Francisand Schweiker v. Gray Panthersto support
similar deference rhetoric, either in conjunction with Chevron
or not.

219

Citation counts and the Court's rhetoric in citing National
Muffler therefore say little or nothing about National Muffler's
continuing significance. The real question is whether the
Court's analysis of the issues before it suggests that the Court
is applying a less deferential multifactor or hybrid analysis

with a Department of Transportation case).

216. All three of these opinions contain such statements. See United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
217. See, e.g., Barnhart,540 U.S. at 26 (citing Chevron for the proposition
that "when the statute 'is silent or ambiguous' we must defer to a reasonable
construction by the agency charged with its implementation"); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 680 n.4 (2003) (describing the
Chevron step-two inquiry as "whether the agency construction is reasonable");
Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 453 (1999)
(finding the agency interpretation "within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, and hence entitled to deference under" Chevron); Estate of Cowart v.
Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) (citing Chevron for the "fundamental principle" of law "requiring judicial deference to a reasonable statutory
interpretation by an administering agency").
218. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 281 (2003).
219. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S.
473, 479, 495, 497 (2002) (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 429 (1977),
for deferring to "permissible" agency choices and Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,
453 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1981), along with United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, for giving a proposed Health & Human Services regulation "respectful
consideration"); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (applying
Chevron and citing Batterton, 432 U.S. at 424-26, for the proposition that the
Court owes the agency's interpretation "more than mere deference or weight");
Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 89 (1990) (citing Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425,
along with Chevron and several other pre- and post-Chevron cases).
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rather than Chevron's two steps and controlling deference. The
Cottage Savings220 and Cleveland Indians Baseball221 cases are
most substantive examples of the Court's reliance on National
Muffler.
The issue in Cottage Savings was whether exchanging one
portfolio of residential mortgage loans for another represented
a "disposition of property" under I.R.C. § 1001.222 No regulation
or pre-litigation ruling addressed the issue precisely; but Treasury Regulation § 1.1001-1 treated an exchange of "properly differing materially" as a disposition, and, as in National Muffler,
the Court characterized the case as challenging both the validity and the meaning of that regulatory language. 223 Concerning
the former question, the Court cited National Muffler princi224
pally in favor of deference to reasonable interpretations.
Nevertheless, the Court employed the reenactment doctrine in
assessing reasonableness. 225 The Court noted that its own jurisprudence had incorporated the .'materially' or 'essentially'
different" standard in the 1920s, that the regulation had employed that standard since 1934, and that Congress had reenacted the Code several times since. 226 In discussing deference,
except when citing the case in deference boilerplate, 227 the
Court typically cites Cottage Savings as support for reenact228
ment doctrine applicability, in both tax and non-tax cases.
As already noted, reenactment doctrine figured prominently in pre-Chevron multifactor deference analysis, particu220. 499 U.S. 554 (1990).
221. United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200 (2001).
222. Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. at 559.
223. Id. at 560 ("We must therefore determine whether the realization
principle in § 1001(a) incorporates a 'material difference' requirement. If it
does, we must further decide what that requirement amounts to and how it
applies in this case.").
224. Id. at 560 ("Because Congress has delegated to the Commissioner the
power to promulgate 'all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of
[the Internal Revenue Code],' 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), we must defer to his regulatory interpretations of the Code so long as they are reasonable.").
225. See id. at 561-62.
226. Id.
227. See Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003) (stating that
general authority regulations must be treated with "deference"); Comm'r v.
Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 120, 123 (1997) (noting that the Court defers to
reasonable interpretative Treasury regulations).
228. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200,
220 (2001); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 434 (2000) (citing Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 562, in support of the reenactment doctrine in a nontax case); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 86 (1991) (same).

1582

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1537

larly in tax cases but also in non-tax ones. That does not necessarily mean that reenactment doctrine is inconsistent with
Chevron.229 To the extent that the Court often considers legislative history in ascertaining plain meaning at Chevron step
one, 230 reenactment doctrine may be of use in that task. In FDA

v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., for example, the Court
employed the reenactment doctrine heavily in Chevron step-one
analysis to conclude that Congress clearly did not intend with
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act to give the FDA authority to
regulate tobacco. 23 1 Although the reenactment doctrine is inconsistent with Chevron's emphasis on interpretive flexibility,
the Court has also acknowledged the doctrine in connection
with Chevron step-two analysis. 232 Consequently, the analysis
of Cottage Savings sheds little light on the Chevron versus National Muffler debate.
Cleveland Indians Baseball offers even less to clarify the
question of deference toward Treasury regulations, notwithstanding its more extended deference discussion. The issue
raised by Cleveland Indians Baseball was whether backpay
awards are "wages" for purposes of FICA and FUTA, the relevant portions of which are incorporated in the Internal Revenue Code and within the interpretive authority of I.R.C.
§ 7805(a). 233 In analyzing the issue, the Court cited National
Muffler for the proposition that deference is appropriate for
reasonable Treasury regulations promulgated under I.R.C.
§ 7805.234 The Court acknowledged that the regulations are
ambiguous as to the question at hand, noted a long-standing
revenue ruling that was on point, and cited a case from the
Seminole Rock line in favor of substantial deference for an

229.

See Caron, supra note 15, at 563-73 (discussing relationship between

tax, Chevron, and the reenactment doctrine generally); Gans, supra note 20, at
764-75 (same).
230. See e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
133-59 (2000); Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 457-60 (1998); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 848-53, 862-64 (1984).
231. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143-59.
232. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226-27 (2002); see also Brown
& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for limiting agency interpretive choice); Robert A. Anthony, Keeping Chevron
Pure, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 371 (2002) (same).
233. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 3101 (FICA), 3111 (FICA), 3121 (FICA), 3301
(FUTA), 3306 (FUTA) (2000).
234. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200,
219 (2001).
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agency's interpretation of its own regulations. 235 The Court
then cited Cottage Savings along with pre-Chevron tax jurisprudence other than National Muffler for the reenactment doctrine point that agency interpretations that survive congressional reenactment carry the force and effect of law. 236
Whatever the significance of this analysis for Seminole Rock
deference or the reenactment doctrine, without stretching the
rhetoric significantly, it is impossible to discern any clear
statement concerning the applicability of controlling deference
versus multifactor respect to Treasury regulations.
By contrast, the Court was significantly clearer in Atlantic
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner,237 another case that
post-dates Cottage Savings. That case involved a general authority Treasury regulation interpreting the phrase "reserve
strengthening" used in I.R.C. § 1023.238 In this opinion, the
Court cited Chevron and expressly and unequivocally employed
Chevron's two-step analysis, concluding first that the statute is
ambiguous, 239 then continued to consider the regulation's reasonableness. 240 The Court did not cite National Muffler, but did
cite Cottage Savings for the proposition that the Court's task at
step two "is to decide, not whether the Treasury Regulation
represents the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it
represents a reasonable one." 24 1 The Court's Chevron step-two
analysis in Atlantic Mutual does not mention reenactment, lon-

235.

See id. at 218-19. The Court cites Thomas Jefferson University v. Sha-

lala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994), in favor of substantial deference for an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations. See Cleveland Indians Baseball, 532 U.S.
at 220. The relevant passage from Thomas Jefferson University makes the
same point and cites, among other cases, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945), and Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), as support. See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512; see also discussion supra
note 85 (discussing Seminole Rock deference).
236. See Cleveland Indians Baseball, 532 U.S. at 219-20 (citing Cottage
Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 561 (1990)). The relevant passage in Cottage Savings quotes United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967),
which in turn quotes Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938), for the
point that "Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without
substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect
of law." Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. at 561.
237. 523 U.S. 382 (1998).
238. Id. at 385-86.
239. See id. at 387-89.
240. See id. at 389-91.
241. Id. at 389.
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gevity, or contemporaneity, but rather Treasury's reasonable242
ness in balancing competing policy goals.
The taxpayer in Atlantic Mutual named Chevron as providing the appropriate evaluative standard before the Court. 24 3 By
contrast, the taxpayers in Cleveland Indians Baseball primarily emphasized that the revenue rulings were not entitled to
Chevron deference in light of Christensen v. Harris County because revenue rulings do not carry the force of law. 24 4 The tax245
payers in Cottage Savings did not mention deference at all.
In each of these cases, however, the deference discussions in
the government's briefs were hedged, offering platitudes and
string citations supporting deference, sometimes citing both
Chevron and National Muffler together, without clearly articulating the appropriate reviewing standard. 246 Thomas Merrill
has recalled from his experience as Deputy Solicitor General in
the late 1980s that, at least at that time, the Solicitor General's
Office perceived Chevron as very important in the lower courts
but vulnerable at the Supreme Court, and so deliberately
avoided any "direct showdown" over the Chevron doctrine's applicability. 24 7 This disclosure goes a long way toward explaining
both the government's briefing and the Court's inconsistency on
deference to Treasury regulations thus far.
The best interpretation of the Court's post-Chevron citation
of both Chevron and National Muffler is that the Court simply
has not decided what standard to apply in reviewing Treasury
regulations. The more recent Boeing Co. v. United States248 at

242. See id.
243. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 13, Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r,
523 U.S. 382 (1998) (No. 97-147) 1997 WL 748712.
244. See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 10, United States v. Cleveland
Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200 (2001) (No. 00-203) 2001 WL 43587 (citing
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 585-86 (2000)).
245. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499
U.S. 554 (1990) (No. 89-1965) 1990 WL 505730; Reply Brief of PetitionerAppellant, Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. 544 (No. 89-1965) 1991 WL 521608.
246. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 20, Cleveland Indians Baseball,
532 U.S. 200 (No. 00-203) 2001 WL 167410; Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 7,
17, Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 523 U.S. 382 (No. 97-147) 1998 WL 3221; Brief of
Respondent-Appellee at 13-14, Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. 554 (1990) (No. 891965) 1990 WL 505732. But see Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supranote
244, at 19-20 (citing Mead briefs and seeming to argue for strong deference for
revenue rulings, but not citing Chevron).
247. Thomas W. Merrill, Confessions of a Chevron Apostate, 19 ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS 1 (1994).
248. 537 U.S. 437 (2003).
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least implicitly supports this conclusion. Boeing concerned the
validity of a Treasury regulation addressing the accounting for
research and development expenditures in computing "combined taxable income" for "domestic international sales corporations" or "DISCs."249 The government in Boeing argued at
some length that the regulation was a specific authority regulation and thus legislative in character and entitled to Chevron
deference. 250 In the process, the government cited Chevron and
Mead as well as Batterton v. Francis.251 Even if the regulation
were not legislative, however, the government contended that
the Court's level of deference would be "extremely high" because Congress had delegated the primary interpretive authority "to the Commissioner, not to the Courts" and Treasury's interpretation was a reasonable one. 252 The taxpayer and various
amici curiae all but ignored the government's argument on that
point, 253 but when pressed by Justices Souter and O'Connor at
oral argument, the taxpayer asserted that the regulation was a
general authority regulation and conceded only that the regulation was entitled to some unspecified degree of deference or respect if it was reasonable. 254 In the end, the Court acknowledged the specific authority grant, observed that Treasury cited
Code § 7805 in promulgating the regulation, and opined cryptically that "[e]ven if we regard the challenged regulation as interpretative because it was promulgated under § 7805(a)'s general rulemaking grant rather than pursuant to a specific grant
of authority, we must still treat the regulation with deference." 25 5 For this proposition, the Court cited Cottage Savings,
which, as already noted, is hardly the picture of clarity on the

point. 256

249. Id. at 445-46.
250. See Brief for the Respondent-Appellee at 20-21, Boeing, 537 U.S. 437
(Nos. 01-1209, 01-1382).
251. See id.
252. See id. at 20 (quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307
(1967)).
253. In its reply brief, the taxpayer cited United States v. Vogel Fertilizer,
Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26 (1982), for the proposition that the regulation, "whether or
not . . . thought to be 'legislative' in character," was not entitled to deference
because it was inconsistent with the statute. Reply Brief for the PetitionerAppellant at 18, Boeing, 537 U.S. 437 (No. 01-1209).
254. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-14, 27, Boeing, 537 U.S. 437 (Nos.
01-1209, 01-1382).
255. See Boeing, 537 U.S. at 448.
256. See id.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

1586

[90:1537

It was consistent with the Court's post-Chevron jurispru-

dence up until Christensenand Mead for the Court to have ignored or glossed through an issue like the level of deference
appropriate for Treasury regulations. 257 Although the postMead Court now is more focused on questions of Chevron's
scope, it would nevertheless be typical for the Court to defer
making a definitive statement until the issue is squarely presented and adequately briefed.
Beyond the muddle of the Court's citation of Chevron and
National Muffler in tax cases, the ABA Task Force Report particularly relies heavily on language in Chevron and Mead as
supporting its bifurcation of deference doctrine between specific
and general authority Treasury regulations. 258 For example,
the Task Force Report reads Chevron and Mead as requiring
different degrees of deference for specific authority versus general authority regulations because, in the words of the Court,
exercises of "explicit" delegations are given Chevron-level "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute" but those of "implicit" delegations
are subject to a more intrusive reasonableness inquiry. 259 Although a creative reading of Chevron, the Court has not followed this distinction in non-tax cases. Instead, the Court regularly uses the arbitrary and capricious language in discussing
Chevron and general authority regulations, 260 and the Court
likewise defers to specific authority regulations as reasonable.

261

The ABA Task Force also discusses at some length the
Court's post-Mead opinion in Barnhart v. Walton, a non-tax
case involving Social Security Administration regulations
promulgated through notice and comment. 262 In an opinion au-

257. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 43, at 848-52 (identifying
numerous circuit splits and open questions concerning Chevron's scope that
developed through the 1980s and 1990s).
258. See Salem et al., supra note 20, at 739.

259. See id. at 739 n.59 (quoting and interpreting Chevron and Mead); see
also Galler, Chevron and Administrative Regulation, supra note 109, at 179596 (reading Chevron step two similarly).
260. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86
(2002); Id. at 97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Smiley v. Citibank, N. A., 517 U.S.
735, 742 (1996); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 528 (1990).
261. See, e.g., Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242-43
(2004); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 501-02, 523 (2002); Nat'l
Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333 (2002).
262. Barnhart v. Wilson, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
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thored by Justice Breyer, the Court applied Chevron deference
to uphold the regulations, but in so doing meandered into dicta
observing that
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of
the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the
statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time
all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through
which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at is2 63

sue.

Judges and non-tax scholars have debated whether Justice
Breyer's rhetoric signals the relevance of such Skidmore-like
factors as agency expertise, consistency, and longevity for Chevron analysis. 264 The ABA Task Force concludes that, under
Mead, Chevron and Skidmore clearly espouse different doctrines and ultimately describes Barnhart'ssignificance merely
265
as "confusing."
The best explanation for Barnhart's discussion of Chevron
is that, even though Justice Breyer joined the majority's opinion in Mead, he has long articulated a different vision of Chevron that is not wholly consistent with Mead as understood by
the Court's majority. 266 For Justice Breyer, Chevron and
Skidmore do not represent two distinguishable standards of review; instead, Chevron merely adds to traditional Skidmore
deference "an additional, separate legal reason for deferring to
certain agency determinations." 267 Other post-Mead opinions of
the Court demonstrate that the majority of the Court does not
share Justice Breyer's view, however. 268 In particular, more re263. Id. at 222.
264. Compare, e.g., Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 879 (7th
Cir. 2002) (describing Barnhart as "suggest[ing] a merger between Chevron
deference and Skidmore's"), with id. at 882 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("I do
not perceive in [Barnhart v.] Walton any 'merger' between Chevron and
Skidmore, which Mead took such pains to distinguish."); see also John F.
Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 939 n.227 (2004)
(recognizing Barnhart's blurring of Chevron and Skidmore as inconsistent
with Mead).
265. Salem et al., supra note 20, at 755.
266. See Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 472 (2002); Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally
Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 198202 (2006) (discussing Justice Breyer's view of Chevron).
267. Christensen,529 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
268. See, e.g., Evans, 536 U.S. at 487 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(criticizing Justice Breyer's discussion of Chevron as unnecessary dicta and
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cently in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v.
EPA, the Court noted Barnhart's mention of longevity before
expressly rejecting that factor as relevant to Chevron analy-

sis. 269 Ultimately, therefore, Barnhart offers little to inform the

debate over deference to Treasury regulations.
In sum, while the Court's rhetoric is sufficiently vague to
permit multiple outcomes on the question of deference in this
area, the best reading of the Court's case law is that it has not
yet decided the question. In any event, the Court's postChevron analysis in both tax and non-tax deference cases is devoid of any hint that the legislative/interpretative distinction
governs the assessment of Chevron's applicability. While the
courts continue to use the legislative and interpretative categories to describe regulations and assess the applicability of the
APA's notice and comment requirements, those categories
should not be particularly relevant for a Chevron inquiry that
emphasizes delegation and force of law. 270 Yet much of the on-

going debate over Chevron deference for Treasury regulations
hinges on the interpretative label applied to such regulations
by the tax community. In particular, those who wish to deny
Chevron deference to general authority Treasury regulations
often rely heavily on the Court's emphasis on the legislative
versus interpretative distinction in the Vogel Fertilizer and
Rowan Cos. cases, even though the Court has never cited those
cases since Chevron except for wholly unrelated propositions. 271
inconsistent with Mead); Barnhart,535 U.S. at 226-27 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing Justice Breyer's dicta as
incompatible with Mead); see also Anthony, supra note 232, at 373-74 (noting
the irreconcilability of Mead and Justice Breyer's conception of Chevron).
269. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487-88
(2004) (counseling Skidmore rather than Chevron deference for internal EPA
guidelines notwithstanding its acknowledged longevity).
270. It is possible, however, that there is some overlap in the standards
applied to evaluate whether a particular regulatory effort is subject to the notice and comment requirements of APA § 553 and whether the resulting regulation carries the force of law. See infra Part III.B.
271. Vogel Fertilizeris the only case in which the Supreme Court has cited
Rowan Cos. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer, 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982). The
Court cited Vogel Fertilizer twice shortly after deciding Chevron, both times in
non-tax cases. In Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, the Court quoted
Vogel Fertilizerto counsel "attach[ing] great weight to agency representations
to Congress" as to statutory meaning where the agency assisted in drafting
the statute and clearly expressed its interpretation of the law in testimony before responsible congressional committees. 470 U.S. 768, 788 (1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors,
the Court quoted Vogel Fertilizersolely for the proposition that "[j]udicial def-
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Summary

The common understanding of a unique tax deference tradition simply does not accord with the Court's jurisprudence or
the pre-Chevron scholarship. The evolution of judicial deference
principles in the tax and non-tax contexts follows the same
general path, with significant scholarly comparison and citation overlap. Moreover, National Muffler is entirely consistent
with the Court's other pre-Chevron jurisprudence, particularly
as the Court grappled with the explosion in policy making
through regulation in the years immediately preceding Chevron. While it seems clear that the Court is avoiding conclusively resolving the issue of judicial deference toward Treasury
regulations until clearly asked to do so, the Court's postChevron jurisprudence does not particularly suggest that the
Court is inclined to apply any standard other than Chevron or
Skidmore in the tax context.
B. THE NORMATIVE CASE
Irrespective of the merits of the doctrinal case for a taxspecific approach to judicial deference, tax scholars and practitioners have offered a variety of normative reasons for utilizing
different deference standards in the tax context. 272 Of course, if
the Chevron doctrine is premised on an assumption that Congress has delegated primary interpretive authority over a statute to an agency rather than the courts, the normative case for
Chevron matters little except to persuade Congress to provide
affirmatively for an alternative standard of review for tax
cases.
Because Mead suggests the potential for differences between agencies and statutes, however, and because tax scholars
and practitioners have used that hook and the previously noted
minor rhetorical deviations from Chevron to open a door for a
tax-specific deference approach, the argument against such an
alternative must address the normative as well as the doctrinal. Moreover, Skidmore is permissive and prudential, not
mandatory, and gives the courts flexibility to grant more or less

erence to an agency's interpretation of a statute only sets the framework for
judicial analysis; it does not displace it." 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court has not cited either Vogel Fertilizer or
Rowan Cos. in any post.Chevron tax case for any proposition whatsoever.
272. See, e.g., Coverdale, supra note 122, at 54-55, 67-68; Salem et al., supranote 20, at 737-50.
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deference where it applies. Consequently, normative arguments
for or against deference carry greater weight to the extent
Skidmore provides the appropriate standard.
Normative justifications abound for judicial deference in
administrative law cases generally and for Chevron particularly, whether tax or otherwise. The Chevron opinion speaks of
the greater substantive expertise and political accountability of
agencies over courts. 273 Skidmore and National Muffler express
similar sentiments, although their standards necessarily pay
less heed to these goals by shifting more interpretive power to
the courts. 274 Given that the Supreme Court hears fewer than
100 cases per year, respecting agencies as primary statutory interpreters, as Chevron does, should yield greater uniformity of
interpretation. 275 On the other hand, Chevron represents a certain pro-agency bias in judicial review that makes many people
uncomfortable absent robust judicial review. 27 6 The virtues and
vices of the Chevron regime apply universally, however, and
alone are inadequate support for a separate tax deference standard. When comparing tax and non-tax practices, the normative case for applying different deferent standards in the tax
context finds little support.
1. Tradition as Normative Argument
The emphasis of so many of the players in this debate on
tradition to some degree renders that argument normative as
well as doctrinal. 277 The notion of implicit congressional delegation is admittedly a fictional one, as Congress most likely gives
little if any consideration to deference doctrine in drafting statutes. 278 If the tax community generally perceives there to be a
273.

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 865-66 (1984).

274. See Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-77
(1979); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
275. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some
Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1118-29 (1987).
276. See discussion supra notes 13, 19-20.
277. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 86.
278. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 50, at 2132; Michael Herz, The
Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 297, 320 (2004)
(criticizing the congressional delegation theory of deference on several
grounds); Scalia, supra note 52, at 516. But see James T. O'Reilly, Deference
Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review
Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1980) (discussing the failed attempt preChevron to amend the APA to curtail judicial deference toward agency legal
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unique tax deference tradition that requires less deference in
tax cases than in those from other areas of administrative law,
then one could argue that Congress drafts the tax laws with
279
that same tradition in mind.

The problem with this argument is that it assumes that a
clear, universally recognized tax tradition exists, when in fact
that is not the case. Putting aside the doctrinal history outlined
above, scholars and the courts are divided over the appropriate
level of deference to Treasury regulations as well as the extent
28 0
and significance of any independent tax deference tradition.
The circuit split alone should be prima facie evidence against
relying on tradition as a basis for denying Chevron deference to
Treasury regulations. Moreover, while Treasury characterizes
most of its regulations as interpretative with respect to APA
notice and comment procedures, among other things, 28 1 Treasury also characterizes even regulations promulgated pursuant
to Code § 7805 as legislative for purposes of claiming Chevron
28 2
deference in briefs to the Court.
The only tradition that the tax community truly seems to
embrace is labeling specific authority Treasury regulations
"legislative" and general authority ones "interpretative." Beyond that, there is no agreement as to the significance of those
labels. Absent a more meaningful consensus, tradition alone is
an inadequate basis for a different tax deference standard.

interpretations, which suggests some congressional recognition of deference
principles).
279. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 86.
280. See supra Parts I.C-D.
281. Treasury also has employed the interpretative rule characterization to
avoid Regulatory Flexibility Act requirements for legislative regulations. The
Regulatory Flexibility Act requires, among other things, that agencies engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking under APA, § 553, evaluate their regulations for their consequences to small businesses and explain their reasons
for rejecting less burdensome alternatives. See Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical
Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213 (analyzing the
Act); see also infra Part III.A (discussing tax context history and application of
the Regulatory Flexibility Act).
282. For example, in Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003), the
Court observed that the Treasury promulgated the regulation at issue, 26
C.F.R. § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979), pursuant to its authority under I.R.C. § 7805(a)
(2000). See 537 U.S. at 447-48 (citing Proposed Rules, Dep't of Treasury, 41
Fed. Reg. 49,160 (Nov. 1976)). In its brief before the Court, however, Treasury
claimed that the regulation was legislative and thus entitled to Chevron deference. See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 20-21, Boeing, 537 U.S. 437 (Nos.
01-1209, 01-1382).
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2. Penalty Severity
Some who support different deference standards in the tax
context suggest that the severity of the penalties imposed for
taking a tax position contrary to that of a Treasury regulation
makes civil tax enforcement comparable to criminal cases,

283

where Chevron deference is considered inappropriate. 28 4 Given
the harshness of these potential civil penalties, the exceptionalists contend that, at most, a diluted version of Chevron should
285
apply to general authority Treasury regulations.
Chevron's inapplicability in criminal cases has little if anything to do with the potential penalties imposed upon conviction, however. Certainly, the severity of criminal sanctions is
relevant to the interpretation of criminal statutes. Recognizing
the stakes in criminal cases, the Court has long applied the
rule of lenity, construing criminal statutes narrowly in favor of
the alleged violator. 28 6 The decision not to apply Chevron in the
criminal context, however, is due more to the perception that
the courts, and not the Justice Department, are responsible for
administering the criminal code rather than concerns over the
severity of criminal punishment. 28 7 By contrast, with Chevron,
the Court has accepted congressional delegation of primary
-administrative authority over complex regulatory structures to
the agencies rather than the courts.
Moreover, the penalties imposed on straying taxpayers
283. See Salem et al., supra note 20, at 724 & n.17. To be clear, neither the
ABA Task Force Report nor this Article addresses Chevron in the context of
criminal tax evasion or fraud cases. Both consider only Chevron in the civil tax
context.
284. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[W]e have never thought that the interpretation of those charged
with prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference."); Seneca-Cayuga
Tribe of Okla. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1031 (10th Cir.
2003) ("Because the Johnson Act is a federal criminal statute enforced by the
United States Department of Justice, we owe no deference to the NIGC's construction."); United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(supporting same); see also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal
Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996) (acknowledging the proposition
despite arguing in favor of Chevron's application in the criminal context).
285. See Salem et al., supra note 20, at 724 & n.17.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518
(1992); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213 (1985); see also Zachary
Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885,
885-86 (2004); Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 57, 58 (1998).

287. See Crandon, 494 U.S. at 177-78 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Kahan, supra note 284, at 490.
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simply are not so onerous comparatively. Admittedly, the penalties and interest charges that may be levied against a taxpayer who underreports his or her income tax liability can be
burdensome. I.R.C. § 6662 imposes a penalty of twenty percent
on any underpayment of taxes resulting from taxpayer negligence as well as intentional disregard of tax rules and regulations, 28 8 and I.R.C. § 6662 and related Treasury regulations
construe negligence broadly. 289 Separately, the Code requires
taxpayers who underpay their taxes to pay interest on assessed
and unpaid taxes. 290 With daily compounding, it is not unusual
for such penalties and interest to exceed the amount of tax due.
Burdensome as the Code's civil penalties may be, across
the administrative law spectrum, there are many instances of
agencies administering statutes carrying severe financial penalties and receiving Chevron deference for their interpretations
of those statutes. In the environmental context, for example,
the Safe Drinking Water Act gives the Environmental Protection Agency significant rulemaking authority to establish safe
thresholds for drinking water contaminants. 291 Violators of the
EPA's regulations are subject to civil penalties of up to $25,000
per day until the violation is remedied. 292 Nevertheless, the

288.

See I.R.C. §§ 6662(a)-(b) (2000).

289. "Negligence" for these purposes includes "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of" the Code. I.R.C. § 6662(c). A
taxpayer will not be assessed an underpayment penalty for taking a position
on his or her tax return that has a "reasonable basis"; but where the government's contrary interpretation of the Code is advanced by a Treasury regulation, "[t]he reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that
is merely arguable or that is merely a colorable claim." Treas. Reg. § 1.66623(b)(1), (3) (as amended in 2003). For a return position contrary to a Treasury
regulation to have a reasonable basis, the position must be supported by some
other Treasury or IRS regulation, ruling, or pronouncement. See Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.6662-3(b)(3), 1.6662-4(d) (as amended in 2003). In short, unless the government has issued contradictory interpretations of the Code, a taxpayer who
disagreed with a Treasury regulation's interpretation of the Code, and takes a
contrary but colorable position on a tax return, is subject to the twenty percent
underpayment penalty in the event that the taxpayer either elects not to contest a deficiency assessment or has his or her position rejected by the courts.
Notably, the reasonable basis standard is provided only by the Treasury Department itself through regulation and not by Congress or the Code. Theoretically, therefore, the reasonable basis standard is itself subject to judicial review. That said, to date, it appears that no one has raised such a challenge.
290. See I.R.C. §§ 6601(a), 6621(a)(2), 6622 (2000). The Code also imposes
interest on the twenty percent underpayment penalty from the date of assessment until payment. See id. § 6601(e)(2) (2000).
291. See 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2000).
292. See id. § 300g-3(3)(A).
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courts have applied Chevron deference to EPA's safe drinking
293
water regulations.
The severity of financial penalties in any sort of enforcement action is entirely relative, depending upon one's financial
status; but in the civil context, financial penalties in enforcement actions may be the least bad consequence of regulations.
Agency rulemakings regularly entitled to Chevron deference
can alter the structure of entire industry segments, resulting in
substantial and potentially negative economic implications for
at least some regulated parties. 294 The Court has applied Chevron deference to EEOC regulations interpreting the Americans
with Disabilities Act that operate to deny employment to workers. 295 Agencies adopt regulations that interpret statutes to

deny welfare or disability or retirement benefits-basic subsistence means-to arguably eligible recipients, yet the Court does
not hesitate to apply Chevron in evaluating such regulations. 296
Finally, the Court regularly applies Chevron deference in
immigrant deportation cases. Having compared deportation to
criminal sanction, 297 the Court employs the rule of lenity in
evaluating the deportation provisions of immigration stat-

293. See City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
294. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
125 S. Ct. 2688, 2712 (2005) (upholding the FCC determination that cable modem services are not subject to regulation under the Telecommunications Act);
Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 539 (2002) (upholding local
competition regulations promulgated by the FCC under the Telecommunications Act of 1996); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 15-16, 28 (2002) (upholding
FERC regulations imposing open access requirements on owners of electricity
transmission lines).
295. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84-85 (2002) (upholding an EEOC regulation interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act
as allowing employers to refuse to hire someone where the employment in
question would endanger the worker's health).
296. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (upholding Social
Security Administration regulations and denying benefits); Black & Decker
Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 831 (2003) (recognizing that Labor Department regulations interpreting the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 are entitled to Chevron deference); Pauley v. BethEnergy
Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (deferring under Chevron to an agency
interpretation denying Black Lung benefits); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368,
377 n.3 (1987) (applying Chevron to the denial of AFDC benefits).
297. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 132 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Deportation is the equivalent of banishment or exile. Though technically not
criminal, it practically may be." (internal citations omitted)); see also Reid v.
INS, 420 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging
same); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (originating this view).
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utes, 298 and occasionally that doctrine may trump Chevron.299
Nevertheless, because it is clear that Congress has delegated to
the executive branch the primary responsibility for administering the immigration laws, the Court also extends Chevron deference to interpretations rendered through adjudication before
the Board of Immigration Appeals. 300
Perhaps the concern is not so much the economic impact of
the Code's penalties as the perception that the tax laws are
uniquely individual in their application. While immigrant deportation cases are similarly individual in nature, one could argue that areas like environmental law, energy, or telecommunications are less personal and more neutral, pursued for the
broader public good, and not necessarily adverse to regulated
parties.
It is possible to characterize tax in such a broad, neutral
manner as well. Taxes are not imposed for their own sake but
rather to pay for government programs. Taxpayers may disagree over whether one program or another is worth the price
paid; but as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes notoriously observed, "taxes are what we pay for civilized society." 30 1 Conversely, other areas that strike some people as neutrally pursuing the public good may be strikingly individualistic in
application. The farmer who is denied access to the water supply for his crops in order to protect an endangered species of
fish is likely to consider the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act highly personal, 30 2 regardless of the benefits to the general public.
In short, in both absolute and relative terms, as bad as
penalties and interest for underpayment of taxes may be, the
Court applies Chevron to agency interpretations with far worse
potential consequences. Whether or not an argument can be
made generally for denying Chevron deference where the same
agency is charged both with primary interpretation and enforcement responsibilities, the potential severity of tax penal298. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Reid, 420
U.S. at 633-34; Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10; see also Brian G. Slocum, The
Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515,
519-21 (2003).
299. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 & n.45 (2001).
300. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999); Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 448-49.
301. Compaflia General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
302. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
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ties is simply inadequate justification for employing a diluted
version of Chevron or other alternative deference standard in
the tax context.
3.

IRS Overreach

Yet another argument raised by those in favor of a different judicial deference approach in tax cases emphasizes the nature of the tax-collection function.3 0 3 The primary function of
Treasury tax personnel and the IRS is to collect government
revenues; and in light of this goal, Treasury and the IRS may
be biased toward revenue maximization and may adopt regulations and rulings that test the boundaries of reasonableness in
30 4
pursuit of that goal.
The perception of antitaxpayer, revenue-maximizing bias
in the drafting of rules and regulations, while common, is
largely inaccurate. Although Treasury inevitably adopts some
regulations that lean toward greater revenue collection, other
regulations are strikingly pro-taxpayer. The recently-adopted
intangibles capitalization regulations interpreting Code § 263
30 5
and the Court's decision in INDOPCO,Inc. v. Commissioner

303. See, e.g., Salem et al., supra note 20, at 724-25.
304. Mitchell Gans raises a similar but slightly different argument, suggesting that the Treasury's "position as the taxpayer's adversary in tax litigation" will produce anti-taxpayer bias in the Treasury's legal interpretation.
Gans, supra note 20, at 758. As others have done with respect to penalties, as
discussed supra Part JI.B.2. Gans compares tax litigation to criminal prosecution on this point. See Gans, supra note 20, at 758. The analysis offered in Part
II.B.2 applies with equal force to Gans's assertion here. Many, if not most,
agencies engage in both rulemaking and civil enforcement functions while enjoying Chevron deference for their regulations. As in most such agencies, the
IRS is organized so that the lawyers responsible for drafting regulations and
those responsible for enforcement and litigation report to different people, although the Chief Counsel is ultimately responsible for both. See SALTZMAN,
supra note 1, 1.02[4] [a]; INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 24, § 1.1.6
(Feb. 1999) If anything, the tax area offers an additional built-in check against
such alleged interpretive bias in that the IRS coordinates tax litigation with
the Department of Justice's Tax Division as well as with the Treasury Department, although the IRS plays a prominent role in both regulation drafting
and enforcement. See SALTZMAN, supra note 1,
1.02[4][a]; INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 24, § 34.2.1 (May 1990). Regardless, the courts have
long refused to find bias inherent in the performance of both rulemaking and
enforcement tasks by agencies; and it is more likely that Treasury and IRS
officials would draft regulations with an eye toward avoiding litigation rather
than inviting litigation by exceeding their authority. See generally Michael
Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the FederalAdministrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759 (1981).
305. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
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are widely hailed as surprisingly taxpayer friendly.3 06 The
check-the-box entity classification regulations for distinguishing "partnerships" from "associations" for purposes of I.R.C.

§

7701.307

Even if suspicions of revenue-maximizing behavior were
valid, there can be no question that generating revenue for government use is a primary function of the Internal Revenue
Code. Revenue maximization is not Congress's only goal with
the Code, to be sure; and reasonable people can, and do, disagree over how to balance the Code's competing objectives. It is
far from clear, therefore, that interpreting ambiguities in the
Code with an eye toward generating more revenue is per se illegitimate-so long as Treasury keeps its regulatory interpretations within the range of statutorily permissible alternatives.
Chevron's two steps operate to constrain Treasury at least that
much; and within that spectrum of permissibility, it seems
more appropriate for Treasury rather than the courts to decide
whether or not revenue maximization should be the policy emphasis.
Moreover, allegations of this sort of jurisdictional boundary
testing are not limited to the tax context. Many agencies other
than the IRS have been known to test the boundaries of the
statutes they administer, whether in the pursuit of policy goals
agency officials deem wise if perhaps beyond the range of their
30 9
mandate, 308 or for reasons as base as financial self-interest.
310
On
"The desire of power in excess, caused the angels to fall."
306. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4, 1.263(a)-5 (as amended in 2004); see also
Sharon Burnett & Darlene Pulliam, IRS Provides Much-Needed Guidance on
Capitalizationof Intangibles, PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES, Aug, 2004, at 68, 80
("The release of these final regulations places taxpayers in a better position
concerning the capitalization of intangibles than they have ever been.").
307. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 2006).
308. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps. of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (seeking jurisdiction over abandoned sand and
gravel pit as "navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (seeking jurisdiction to regulate tobacco as a drug).
309. See, e.g., Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (considering an agency interpretation of a contract to which the
agency was a party); Mesa Air Group, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 87 F.3d 498
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (same); see also Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference
and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203 (2004) (categorizing and discussing the cases).
310. SIR FRANCIS BACON, Of Goodness & Goodness of Nature, in THE ESSAYS OR COUNSELS, CIVIL AND MORAL, OF FRANCIS LD. VERULAM 51, 51
(1944).
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the other hand, it is not unheard of for agencies to decline to
regulate subject matter arguably within their jurisdiction,
which may be equally problematic depending upon one's per3 11
spective.
At times the Court has recognized in non-tax cases the dilemma of applying Chevron deference to agency interpretations
that raise questions about the scope of, and limitations on, an
agency's congressionally delegated authority. 312 However the
courts ultimately resolve the issue of Chevron in the context of
agency jurisdiction questions, at a minimum, the potential for
Treasury and the IRS to push statutory limits and behave in a
self-interested fashion is not unique and thus should not be relied upon to justify an alternative deference standard in the tax
context. As with any other agency, the Chevron standard by its
own terms allows courts to restrain Treasury within the
boundaries of its delegated authority and reject arbitrary action
by Treasury. The revenue-maximizing effect of Treasury regulations within the scope of delegated authority is a policy matter better addressed through the political process.
4. Expertise
Courts and tax scholars would never suggest that Internal
Revenue Code interpretation requires no special expertise. Indeed, the Court's own cases are littered with references to
Treasury and IRS expertise when it comes to interpreting the
tax laws. 313 In discussing this Article with a non-tax colleague,

311. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005) (involving FCC declining jurisdiction to regulate cable
modem services).
312. In MississippiPower & Light v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, for example,
Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that "[a]gencies do not 'administer'
statutes confining the scope of their jurisdiction, and such statutes are not 'entrusted' to agencies." 487 U.S. 354, 386-87 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia responded in a concurring opinion that many, if not most,
agency interpretations raise questions regarding the scope of the agency's authority. See id. at 377-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, he
concluded, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish garden-variety
statutory interpretations from those with jurisdictional implications. See id. at
381-82. More recently, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., after
rejecting the FDA's effort to interpret the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as giving it unprecedented jurisdiction over the tobacco industry on Chevron stepone grounds, the Court in dicta suggested drawing such a line at "extraordinary cases." 529 U.S. at 159.
313. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S.
200, 219 (2001); Comm'r v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 127 (1997) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477
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however, an interesting question arose concerning whether in
fact Treasury and the IRS possess superior expertise over the
courts in interpreting the Code.
In some complex regulatory areas, making policy choices
requires an evaluation of scientific, engineering, or other technical data that are beyond the experience and understanding of
the average Article III judge. The Environmental Protection
Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, for example, are all agencies whose
responsibilities fuse the law with more scientific disciplines.
Given the agencies' comparatively greater expertise in these
cross-disciplinary areas, it makes sense both that Congress
would delegate substantial policy authority to the agencies and,
consequently, would prefer the agencies to be the primary interpreters of the statutes under their administration. Generalist courts lacking scientific or technical training likewise should
be more inclined to defer to the agencies' interpretations of
such statutes.
Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, by contrast,
rarely, if ever, requires cross-disciplinary scientific or technical
expertise. Meanwhile, as James Landis famously argued, despite their generalist profile, appellate courts are particularly
adept at interpreting statutes. 314 So if statutory interpretation
does not implicate issues informed by special non-legal training
and expertise, then are judges not just as capable as any other
attorney to interpret the statute, and is Chevron appropriate in
such a context?
Of course, it is common knowledge that, for many attorneys (and thus many judges), the financial and economic matters that dominate the Internal Revenue Code are as incomprehensible as the scientific aspects inherent in many
environmental, food and drug, or energy law issues. Moreover,
other areas of administrative law where Chevron regularly applies, such as immigration or securities law, do not require scientific or other technical training; and not every interpretation
of the Endangered Species Act or the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act requires scientific expertise.
Regardless, emphasizing only the scientific or technical aspect of some fields ignores the sometimes overwhelming complexity inherent in most modern regulatory structures like the
(1979); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877).
314. JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154-55 (1938).
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Internal Revenue Code. Many tax cases require expertise in
understanding the relationships between several or even dozens of Code provisions and their implications for complex
transactional settings and structures. For example, it takes the
average tax attorney years to understand the relationships between the consolidated return regulations under I.R.C. § 1502
and I.R.C. § 382 and the reorganization provisions and their
regulations, or the regulations governing the allocation of items
of income and deduction among partners in Subchapter K of
the Code. 3 15 Even more discrete issues may reflect significant
theoretical complexity, as evidenced by the number of Supreme
Court cases in the 1990s dealing with the exclusion from gross
income of personal injury damages 316 or the Court's consideration of how to treat nonrecourse debt upon the disposition of
the property it encumbers. 3 17 If anything, following the delegation premise for Chevron articulated in Mead, the expertise
necessary in interpreting the Code merely justifies imputing to
Congress the decision to grant Treasury such broad, primary
interpretative authority.
5.

Summary

As with the doctrinal case, the normative claims of tax exceptionalism have limited persuasive value when tax practices
are compared with the practices and jurisprudence involving
other areas of administrative law. When examined in broader
context, the claims that "tax is different" simply ring hollow.
Whatever the criticisms and potentially negative implications
of the deference model articulated by Chevron, Skidmore, and
Mead, those ramifications are not limited to nor exacerbated in
the tax context. For all of these reasons, tax does not warrant
its own, unique deference regime, whether based on National
Muffler or otherwise.
III. APPLYING THE MEAD FRAMEWORK
Once one accepts that Chevron and Skidmore are the only
two deference alternatives and that Mead offers the appropri315. See I.R.C., § 1502 (2000); id. § 382; id. §§ 701-77.
316. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 82 (1996); Comm'r v.
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327 (1995); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229

(1992).
317. See Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 308-12 (1983); Crane v. Comm'r,
331 U.S. 1, 3-16 (1947). See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk and Accrual: the
Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 44 TAX L. REV. 401 (1989).
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ate framework for choosing between them, resolving the appropriate standard for Treasury regulations should be fairly simple. As noted previously, Mead's holding clearly articulates a
two-part test for evaluating whether a particular agency interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference or only Skidmore respect. 318 The first inquiry is whether "Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force
of law."3 19 The second question is whether "the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority." 320 A particular agency action only qualifies for
Chevron deference if the answer to both questions is affirmative. 321 Otherwise, Skidmore offers the appropriate evaluative
standard.
While Mead clearly attempts to add structure to the question of Chevron's scope, Mead's holding nevertheless contains
its own analytical holes. 322 At a minimum, the framework articulated in Mead leaves open for further consideration two major questions: how should the courts determine whether Congress has delegated to an agency the requisite administrative
authority; 3 23 and even if the requisite delegation exists, which
interpretive processes represent exercises of such congressionally delegated authority? 324 Both questions turn on the "force of
law" concept, a vague concept for which the Court has provided
325
only minimal guidance.

318.

See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); see also

supra notes 7, 58 and accompanying text.
319. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.

320. Id.
321. See id.; see also Merrill, supra note 8, at 813 (describing the Mead
test).
322. As with Chevron, Mead has been the subject of extensive scholarly
criticism. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation
Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 225-34 (describing the harms threatened by
Mead's framework); Jordan, supra note 7, at 725-26 (noting that Mead fails to
identify which types of agency decisions are implicated); John Manning,
Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 939 n.229 (2004) (describing
several criticisms of Mead); Vermeule, supra note 7, at 355 (speculating about
the heavy burdens of implementing Mead).
323. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 470, 576-90 (noting and attempting to address this issue); Vermeule, supra note 7, at 349-55 (examining
the D.C. Circuit's reaction to this ambiguity).
324. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Three Settings in Which Nonlegislative
Rules Should Not Bind, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2001) (discussing types
of agency action); Merrill, supra note 8,, at 830-32 (same).
325. See Elhauge, supra note 50, at 2139; Merrill, supra note 8, at 826-27;
Sunstein, supra note 266, at 222-25.
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Whatever the ambiguities of the force of law concept, and
the related uncertainties in truly marginal cases, applying
Mead to Treasury regulations is comparatively simple. Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to the Code's specific
and general rulemaking grants bind both taxpayers and the
government with the same legal force as the Code itself. This
simple reality is enough to satisfy Mead and compel Chevron
deference to Treasury regulations.
A. EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

The Mead Court was quite explicit that a specific grant of
rulemaking authority and exercise thereof will satisfy the force
of law requirement: "We have recognized a very good indicator
of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or
adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed." 326 Congress has clearly delegated to the Sec-

retary of the Treasury the specific authority to promulgate legislative regulations in a variety of areas throughout the

Code. 327 Even before Chevron, the Court extended strong judi-

cial deference to such regulations. 328 Thus it is not surprising
that even those who support alternative tax-deference standards concede Chevron's applicability to specific authority regulations. 329
The remaining question is whether general authority
Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a)
are entitled to Chevron deference as well or only Skidmore respect. As already noted, Treasury routinely utilizes APA noticeand-comment rulemaking in promulgating these regulations,
but insists that such regulations are interpretative and that
notice and comment are not required. 330 Nevertheless, Treasury treats general authority regulations as legally binding both
326. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30.
327. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (identifying specific authority grants).
328. See Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981) (acknowledging the standard); see also supra notes 150-54 and accompanying
text.
329. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 81-82; Salem et al., supra note 20,
at 737-38. But see Gans, supra note 20, at 792-93 (calling for legislation to
mandate Skidmore deference for specific authority Treasury regulations).
330. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 24, § 32.1.2.3; Salem et
al., supra note 20, at 728; see also discussion supra note 30 (discussing Treasury's overreliance on its I.R.C. § 7805 authority).
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taxpayers and the government; and, as discussed at length
above, I.R.C. § 6662 imposes financial penalties on taxpayers
who fail to follow Treasury's interpretations of the Code as advanced through general as well as specific authority regulations.
Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts have argued in
favor of equating Mead's force of law requirement with the general authority to promulgate binding "rules and regulations"
and sanctions for the violation of such rules and regulations by
the regulated party. 331 Merrill and Watts offer extensive historical justification for such a rule as representing the best
across-the-board indicator of the congressional delegation necessary for Chevron deference.3 3 2 The delegation to the Secretary
of the Treasury of the authority to "prescribe all needful rules
and regulations," coupled with the sanctions imposed by I.R.C.
§ 6662, seems quite to fit that bill. 3 aa
Interestingly, however, Merrill and Watts present a survey
of historical evidence against applying their convention to general authority Treasury regulations adopted pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 7805(a).3 34 They catalogue early debates over whether the
general authority grant of § 7805(a)'s predecessor would be
binding upon taxpayers and the repeated rejection of an
amendment by Senator Deal denying such weight to regulations promulgated under § 7805(a). 335 Merrill and Watts speculate that the rejection could mean that most legislators understood that general authority Treasury regulations promulgated
33 6
under § 7805(a) would not carry the force and effect of law.

331. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 471-72.
332. See id. at 493-528.
333. I.R.C. §§ 6662, 7805(a) (2000).
334. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 570-73.
335. See id.
336. See id. Merrill and Watts also premise their argument on their characterization of early income tax penalties as applying only to specific authority
grants in the I.R.C. See id. at 571-73. I believe that Merrill and Watts have
misconstrued the early tax penalty provisions. Merrill and Watts focus their
analysis largely on the rulemaking grants and penalty provisions in sections
1001 through 1005 of the War Revenue Act of 1917, although they correctly
note similar rulemaking grants in subsequent Revenue Acts and ascribe the
same penalty structure to the Internal Revenue Codes of 1939 and 1954. See
id. Sections 1001 and 1002 of the War Revenue Act of 1917 give Treasury the
authority to promulgate regulations governing the keeping of records, filing of
returns, and payment of taxes. See War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64271, sections 1001, 1002, 40 Stat. 300, 325 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 71-77). Merrill and Watts characterize regulations under sections 1001 and
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Merrill and Watts link this history to the tax community's
practice of applying the interpretative label to such regulations. 337 When considered in conjunction with the understanding of the nondelegation doctrine common to that era, their
speculation seems quite plausible.
Whatever the original understanding, however, more recent events speak to the contrary. Since the Court decided
Chevron, Congress has repeatedly broadened and increased the
penalties for failure to adhere to Treasury regulations in filing
a tax return. In 1986, Congress rephrased and expanded the
scope of the negligence penalty provision to make clear that
even an unintentional failure to adhere to Treasury's "rules
and regulations" would be subject to penalties. 33 8 Subsequently,
1002 as specific authority regulations, see Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at
571; but while the early Revenue Acts included several specific grants of authority to issue substantive regulations, see supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text, the regulations under sections 1001 and 1002 are regarded generally as procedural rather than legislative in character. Meanwhile, section
1004 imposes penalties only for intentional fraud and for failure to file a return, but not for failure to adhere to regulations, whether specific or general,
in computing taxes owed. See War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-271,
§ 1004, 40 Stat. 300, 325 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77); see also
Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Penalties-They Shoot Dogs, Don't They?", 43
FLA. L. REV. 811, 830-31, 837 (1991) (detailing penalty provision history). By
contrast, § 250(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 specifically adopted an admittedly minimal and rarely imposed five percent civil penalty for "negligence,"
which was expanded by the Revenue Act of 1921 to "negligence or intentional
disregard of authorized rules and regulations," where a taxpayer is subsequently assessed additional taxes. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254,
§250(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1083 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77);
Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, §250(b), 42 Stat. 227, 264-65 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77); see also Arnold Hoffman, Intentional Disregard of Rules and Regulations, 28 TAXES 111, 111 (1950) (discussing penalty
exposure); Winslow, supra, at 837-38. While the negligence provision is not
textually limited to specific authority regulations, given the common understanding of the relationship between general authority regulations and the
nondelegation doctrine, it is possible that Congress in 1918 and 1921 did not
intend for the negligence penalty to apply to general authority Treasury regulations. See discussion supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
337. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 48, at 570-73.
338. Prior to 1986, the negligence penalty only applied to "intentional disregard of rules and regulations." Winslow, supra note 336, at 838. Many courts
have interpreted this language as requiring actual knowledge of and intent to
ignore the relevant Treasury regulations before penalties would apply. See,
e.g., Hill v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 225, 251-52 (1974); see also Hoffman, supra note
336, at 112-13 (documenting early cases). In 1986, Congress expanded the
negligence penalty to cover "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with" or "any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard" for the Code and
Treasury regulations. I.R.C. § 6653(a)(3) (1986) (repealed 1989); see also Winslow, supra note 336, at 838.
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in 1989, Congress revisited and entirely restructured the
I.R.C.'s penalty provisions but left the expanded language of
the negligence penalty-now called the "accuracy-related penalty"-substantially unaltered. 339 It may or may not be fair to
presume that Congress appreciated the potential consequences
to judicial deference of using the "rules and regulations" terminology in the penalty provision. It is notable, however, that
Congress used the same "rules and regulations" language in
both I.R.C. § 6662 and I.R.C. § 7805(a); and Treasury's regulations interpreting § 6662 do not distinguish between specific
authority and general authority Treasury regulations in pre340
scribing § 6662's applicability.
Separately, Congress has had the opportunity to consider
Treasury's position that its general authority regulations are
interpretative for APA purposes. In 1980, Congress adopted the
Regulatory Flexibility Act 3 41 (RFA), mandating that agencies

analyze the burdens imposed on small businesses by their proposed regulations and explain the reasons for not adopting less
onerous alternatives.3 42 The RFA's requirements generally only
apply to informal agency rulemaking subject to the notice and
comment requirements of APA § 553(b).343 Thus, since interpretative rules are exempt from the APA's notice and comment re344
quirements, the RFA generally does not apply to them.

Based upon its historical categorization of its general authority
regulations as interpretative, Treasury initially claimed that
virtually all of its regulations were likewise excused from the
regulatory flexibility analysis.3 45 After hearing numerous com339. See I.R.C. §6662(a)-(b) (2000).
340. See id. §§ 6662, 7805(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3 (2000). While Treasury
also asserts applicability of these penalties for failure to follow less formal
(and non-legally binding) revenue rulings, Treasury distinguishes revenue rulings from general authority regulations and is more lenient in allowing taxpayers to avoid penalties in declining to follow revenue rulings. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2).
341. Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 3(a), 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 601-12 (2000)).
342. See Verkuil, supra note 281, at 219, 229-30.
343. See 5 U.S.C. § 603(a); see also id. § 603(a) (1994) (showing original
statutory language).
344. Id. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2000).
345. See 142 CONG. REC. E571, E573 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (Extensions
of Remarks by Rep. Henry J. Hyde) ("Many IRS rulemakings involve 'interpretative rules' that IRS contends need not be promulgated pursuant to section
553 of the Administrative Procedures Act."); 142 CONG. REC. S2148, 82156
(Mar. 15, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).

1606

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1537

plaints from the Small Business Administration and others
over Treasury's excuse for ignoring the RFA's mandate, 346 Congress amended the RFA in 1996 to require regulatory flexibility
analysis for all Treasury regulations published in the Code of
Federal Regulations, which includes those promulgated pursuant to Code

§ 7805.347

The revised RFA and its legislative history are not determinative of the question whether general authority Treasury
regulations are legislative or interpretative for APA purposes.
In fact, quite the opposite is the case. The statute does not declare all Treasury regulations to be legislative, but rather provides:
In the case of an interpretative rule involving the internal revenue
laws of the United States, this chapter applies to interpretative rules
published in the Federal Register for codification in the Code of Federal Regulations, but only to the extent that such interpretative3 rules
48
impose on small entities a collection of information requirement.

The legislative history to the amendments similarly offers no
opinions on whether these regulations are in fact interpreta349
tive, but merely acknowledges Treasury's claim to that effect.
The ABA Task Force on Judicial Deference suggests that
Congress's choice of approach in amending the RFA is indicative of its view that general authority Treasury regulations are
in fact interpretative and thus exempt from the Act's analysis
absent specific language to the contrary. 350 A more plausible
view is that Congress is content to leave the finer points of the
346. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S2148, S2151-53 (Mar. 15, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Bond) (offering letters from small business organizations extending
support for amendments); Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Business,
1995 WL 93626 (Mar. 8, 1995) (statement of Johnny C. Finch, Assistant
Comptroller General, General Government Division).
347. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
§ 241(a)(1), 110 Stat. 847, 864 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808) (2000));
142 CONG. REC. E571-01, E573 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (providing as guidance
to agency officials that "[t]he amendment applies to those IRS interpretative
rulemakings that are published in the Federal Register for notice and comment and that will be codified in the Code of Federal Regulations" but not
'less formal IRS publications such as revenue rulings, revenue procedures,
announcements, publications or private letter rulings."); 142 CONG. REC.
S3242-02, S3244-45 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996) (same); see also discussion supra
note 29 and accompanying text (noting Treasury's utilization of notice-andcomment rulemaking even for its general authority regulations).
348. 5 U.S.C. § 603(a).
349. See 142 CONG. REC. E571, E573 (Mar. 28, 1996); 142 CONG. REC.
S3242-02, S3244-45 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996).
350. See Salem et al., supra note 20, at 739.
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legislative-versus-interpretative distinction to the courts, and
instead simply wants the desired regulatory flexibility analysis
to be performed where necessary to accomplish the RFA's goals,
351
and so chose language more precise to that purpose.
Nevertheless, to be burdensome on small businesses and
thus implicate the concerns Congress intended to address with
the RFA, the qualifying general authority Treasury regulations
would have to be binding. In other words, they would have to
carry the force and effect of law. 352 If they did not, then Congress's insistence upon the regulatory flexibility analysis for
such regulations would be odd. Considered together, the new
I.R.C. § 6662 penalty provisions and the RFA amendments
seem to signal clearly that, whatever its reasoning in the
1920s, Congress now intends for general authority Treasury
regulations promulgated pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a) to carry
the force and effect of law.
B. LEGISLATIVE VERSUS INTERPRETATIVE ANALYSIS
As discussed above, while the Court once relied on the legislative- and interpretative-rule categories in deciding which
deference standard to apply, the Court's post-Chevron jurisprudence disregards that distinction in determining whether or not
Chevron applies. Yet much of the ongoing debate over Chevron
deference for general authority Treasury regulations hinges on
the interpretative label that the tax community applies to such
regulations.
The interpretative-rule category as historically defined included regulations promulgated pursuant to general authority
grants. Yet while nondelegation doctrine principles rendered
such regulations nonbinding in the first part of the twentieth
century, the nondelegation doctrine waned as decades passed.
The years immediately preceding Chevron saw a dramatic in351. Notably, summary statements entered into the record to guide agency
officials as to the amendment's meaning describe the affected regulations as
"interpretative rules' that IRS contends need not be promulgated pursuant to
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act." 142 CONG. REC. E571-01,
E573 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. S3242, S3244-45 (daily ed.
Mar. 29, 1996). Both the use of quotation marks to describe the regulations as
interpretative and the phrase "the IRS contends" support the conclusion that
Congress did not intend to render judgment as to the proper characterization
of such regulations.
352. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S2148, S2156 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Bumpers, noting that such regulations "must be observed if
the business owner wants to avoid a confrontation with the Government").
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crease in legally binding regulations adopted under general authority. Hence, the interpretative-rule category as historically
understood now incorporates both legally binding regulations
published in the Code of Federal Regulations and nonbinding
353
agency guidelines and rulings.
Moreover, it was far from obvious even before Mead that
interpretative rules could not be Chevron-eligible. Chevron itself involved an interpretative regulation, or at least a general
authority regulation, promulgated using notice-and-comment
rulemaking;3 54 and the resemblance of general authority
Treasury regulations to the interpretative regulation at issue
in Chevron strongly suggests that Chevron deference should
apply to them, too. Still, pre-Mead, the circuit courts of appeal
were divided over the question of Chevron deference to interpretative rules, in part as a consequence of the breadth of that
category. 355 Mead's more specific inquiry into delegated authority should go a long way toward resolving this circuit split by
refocusing the inquiry away from the legislative and interpretative labels.
The courts continue to use the legislative and interpretative categories to describe regulations and assess the applicability of the APA's notice and comment requirements, however.
As the Mead Court indicated, agency action can be Chevroneligible even without notice and comment, which suggests that
classifying a regulation as interpretative and thus exempting it
from the notice-and-comment process is not dispositive for a
Chevron inquiry that emphasizes delegation and force of law. 356

353. See Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive"Rules, "Legislative"Rules and
"Spurious"Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 6-15 (1994); William Funk, A Primeron Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 132223, 1323 (2001).
354. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 840-41 (1984) (citing Rules & Regulations, EPA, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766
(Oct. 14, 1981)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1) (2000) (providing authority).
355. See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170,
181-82 (3d Cir. 1995); Johnson City Med. Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973,
975-76 (6th Cir. 1993). Others courts have declined to do so. See, e.g., S. Ute
Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod., 119 F.3d 816, 832-33 (10th Cir. 1997); Jacks v.
Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 985 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997); Massachusetts v. FDIC, 102
F.3d 615, 621 (1st Cir. 1996); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Pena, 44
F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1994).
356. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001) ("[A]s
significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the
want of that procedure here does not decide the case ....").
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The Court's analysis makes equally clear that legislative regulations developed through notice-and-comment rulemaking are
entitled to Chevron deference.35 7 It stands to reason, therefore,
that if Treasury regulations are properly subject to APA's notice and comment requirements, then notwithstanding Treasury's protestations to the contrary, Chevron would provide the
358
appropriate standard for judicial review.
Of course, Treasury insists that its general authority regulations are interpretative and, thus, that public notice and
comment are not required under APA § 553. Treasury's position
seems at least overbroad. As noted above, Treasury regularly
cites I.R.C. § 7805(a) as its primary source of authority even
where a specific authority grant exists; so Treasury's characterization of such regulations would seem to encompass virtually all of its regulations, even where a specific grant of author359
ity arguably supports a particular regulatory action.
Regardless, despite Treasury's insistence that its general authority regulations are interpretative, the agency's characterization of its own regulations is at most only a "starting point"
360
for analyzing their categorization.
The Court has been conspicuously silent in elaborating the
difference between legislative and interpretative rules for APA
purposes; but the lower courts have developed standards for
distinguishing the two. The dominant standard, developed by
the D.C. Circuit in American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety &
Health Administration, emphasizes much like Mead that the
question is whether the rule at issue carries "the force of law."
The court in American Mining Congress offered a four-part inquiry for determining whether a rule has a legal effect, considering (1) whether "in the absence of a legislative rule by the
agency, the legislative basis for agency enforcement would be
inadequate"; (2) whether the agency publishes the rule in the
Code of Federal Regulations; (3) whether the agency has explic-

357. See id. at 230 n.12 (making the point and citing nineteen such cases);
see also Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002) (emphasizing
the agency's use of notice-and-comment rulemaking to adopt a challenged
regulatory provision).
358. See Merrill, supra note 8, at 827-33 (linking legislative rulemaking
authority and Chevron eligibility).
359. See discussion supra note 27 and accompanying text.
360. See, e.g., Hemp Indus. Ass'n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.
2003); Mejia-Ruiz v. INS, 51 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Richard J.
Pierce Jr., DistinguishingLegislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 547, 555 (2000); discussion supra note 23.
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itly invoked its general legislative authority; and finally, (4)
whether the rule in question repudiates or amends another legislative rule. 36 1 Although the D.C. Circuit has since modified
this standard by making publication in the C.F.R. merely nondispositive evidence of agency intent, 362 the fact that Treasury
so publishes its general authority regulations would at least
mitigate if not outweigh its claim that the regulations are interpretative. Certainly many Treasury regulations are sufficiently extensive to be essential for the enforcement actions being litigated, even if they only purport to clarify undefined
statutory terms. 363 More importantly, given the nondelegation
doctrine's decline and prevalent agency reliance on provisions
like I.R.C. § 7805(a) to adopt legally binding regulations, express reliance on I.R.C. § 7805(a) would seem inadequate to
364
trigger the third American Mining Congress test.
At least one circuit uses an older standard known as the
substantial impact test. The substantial impact test provides
that a regulation is legislative rather than interpretative if it
has a substantial impact on regulated parties. 365 The test has
been criticized as overly inclusive. 366 Yet the Fifth Circuit still
applies a variation of the substantial impact test. In Professionals & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, that court
361. Am. Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106,
1109-11 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Hemp Indus., 333 F.3d at 1087 (applying
this standard); N.Y. City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 13 (2d Cir.
1995) (same); Pierce, supra note 360, at 556-57 (discussing this standard).
362. See Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
363. See, e.g., Treas Reg. § 1.702-1 (2005) (interpreting the intent of subchapter K-the partnership anti-abuse regulations); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1
to -3 (2000) (interpreting "corporation"-the so-called "check-the-box regulations"); see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579,
588 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("If the statute or rule to be interpreted is very general...
and the 'interpretation' really provides all the guidance, then the latter will
more likely be a [legislativel regulation."). Treasury's propensity for relying on
I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000) even for regulations that arguably are specifically authorized only reinforces this point. See discussion, supra note 30. But see
Health Ins. Ass'n, 23 F.3d at 423 ('The dividing line ... is whether implementing regulations are necessary in order to make a statutory scheme fully operative.").
364. See, e.g., Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
365. See Funk, supra note 353, at 1325-26.
366. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Lexington, Tenn. v. Sanders, 946 F.2d
1185, 1189 n.2 (6th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging the questionability of the substantial impact test but applying it as appropriate for the case at bar); see also
Funk, supra note 353, at 1326.
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asked whether the rule at issue was binding in that it imposed
"rights and obligations" on regulated parties and also whether
the rule "leaves the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise discretion" or, conversely, binds the agency as well as regulated parties."

36 7

Treasury regulations have always been bind-

ing on government officials, even when most tax scholars
agreed that such regulations could not bind taxpayers or the
courts.3 68 Now that I.R.C. § 6662 and the regulations thereunder clearly impose penalties for disregarding general authority Treasury regulations in filing tax return, such regulations
impose rights and obligations and are binding on taxpayers and
the government alike.
Even some in the tax community who advocate in favor of
tax exceptionalism nevertheless acknowledge that general authority Treasury regulations are most likely legislative in character.3 69 To the extent this is the case, the applicability of Chevron deference should be clear. Post-Mead, it makes no
difference for purposes of assessing the applicability of Chevron
deference whether Treasury regulations are legislative or interpretative in character. The relevant inquiry now is whether
they carry the force and effect of law.
C. COUNTERARGUMENTS

Arguing in favor of Skidmore respect rather than Chevron
deference, John Coverdale offers several indicators that Congress would want general authority Treasury regulations to receive a lesser degree of deference. First, Coverdale emphasizes
the text and structure of the Code.3 7 0 Coverdale argues that, if
both specific authority and general authority Treasury regulations carry the force of law, and Treasury can achieve the same
legal result with general authority regulations that it can with
specific authority regulations, then Congress would not need to

367.

Prof'ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595

(5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 &

n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also Tex. Sav. & Cmty. Bankers Ass'n v. Fed. Hous.
Fin. Bd., 201 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying the test).
368. See, e.g., Alvord, supra note 131, at 261; Surrey, supra note 143, at
557.
369. See, e.g., Salem et. al., supra note 20, at 738-39; see also Cunningham
& Repetti, supra note 3, at 45 (acknowledging that general authority Treasury
regulations are legislative under general standards but that the tax community does not follow this norm).
370. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 85-86.
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enact specific authority grants. 371 In other words, giving specific authority and general authority Treasury regulations the
same legal weight renders the specific authority grants redun372
dant, according to Coverdale.
Coverdale's argument denies the significance of several
other provisions of the Code. With I.R.C. § 7801(a), Congress
assigned to Treasury the responsibility for administering and
enforcing the tax laws. 373 Administration and enforcement necessarily entail interpretation. 3 74 I.R.C. § 7801(a) thus gives
Treasury sufficient power to issue nonbinding interpretive
guidance representing its view of the Code's meaning. Consequently, general authority Treasury regulations issued pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a) must represent something more. With
I.R.C. § 7805(a), Congress expressly gave Treasury the authority to promulgate regulations as needed to enforce the tax laws.
With I.R.C. § 6662, Congress signaled its intent that such regulations bind taxpayers as well as Treasury. To deny general authority Treasury regulations Chevron deference ignores the
signal of I.R.C. § 6662 and renders the general authority grant
of I.R.C. § 7805(a) superfluous.
Moreover, Coverdale's argument assumes that Congress
recognizes all the ambiguities inherent in the Code at the time
of enactment. Clearly, where Congress intentionally leaves
statutory gaps for Treasury to fill, it utilizes specific authority
grants to indicate such intent.3 7 5 It is unrealistic to expect Congress to anticipate every ambiguity, however. A better reading
of I.R.C. § 7805(a)'s general authority grant is as an acknowledgment that unanticipated uncertainties of statutory meaning
will arise and as a clear statement that Congress prefers
Treasury, rather than the courts, to be the institution to resolve
such questions.
371. See id.; see also Surrey, supra note 143, at 576-77 (making a similar
argument, though for different reasons).
372. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 85-86.
373. See I.R.C. § 7801(a) (2000).
374. See Lee, supra note 23, at 24. Some scholars would suggest that such
interpretive power is inherent in the executive, while others maintain that
congressionally delegated enforcement power must be present. See generally
Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 701, 704-13 (summarizing different views of the Constitution's Article
II Vesting Clause). Regardless of one's view of what is required for an executive department to have the power to interpret a statute within its jurisdiction, it seems clear that Treasury possesses such authority.
375. See discussion supra notes 25, 130-31 and accompanying text (identifying specific authority grants).
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Coverdale also identifies the existence of the Tax Court as
evidence that Congress clearly desires independent rather than
deferential review for general authority Treasury regulations. 376 To support this position, Coverdale cites congressional
action in 1924 creating the Board of Tax Appeals (the "BTA" or
"Board"), the predecessor to the modern Tax Court, for the purpose of providing 'an independent review of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue's determination of additional income and
377
estate taxes' before the additional tax could be collected."
Coverdale maintains that the existence of the Tax Court and
the tax deference standard of National Muffler (which Coverdale equates with Skidmore) represent a delicate balance between respect for Treasury's role in interpreting the Code and
the need for independent review of IRS enforcement actions,
378
including Treasury interpretations of law.

Coverdale's argument on this point should apply equally to
specific authority Treasury regulations, yet he acknowledges
the appropriateness of Chevron deference in such cases. 379 Even
if Coverdale were correct in his assessment that Congress was
concerned with judicial review of general authority Treasury
regulations when it created the Tax Court in 1924, its subsequent post-Chevron actions equating specific and general authority Treasury regulations for penalty and Regulatory Flexibility Act purposes suggest that Congress now feels differently.
Regardless, a more thorough review of the Tax Court's origins
renders Coverdale's assertion on this point doubtful.
The BTA's creation was not the genesis of judicial review of
tax cases. Before Congress established the Board in 1924, aggrieved taxpayers could and did challenge IRS determinations
in both the United States Court of Federal Claims and in the
federal district courts. 380 Without first paying the tax and suing

376. Unlike most areas of administrative law, tax has its own Article I
court-the Tax Court. See 32 AM. JUR.2D FederalCourts § 6 (1995) (listing the
Article I courts). Taxpayers seeking to challenge IRS assessments may choose
to pursue their cases in the Tax Court, in the United States Court of Federal
Claims, which is another Article I court, or in United States Federal District
1.05-.06.
Court, which is an Article III court. See SALTZMAN, supra note 1,
377. Coverdale, supra note 122, at 86 (quoting Old Colony Trust v. Comm'r,
279 U.S. 716, 721 (1929)).
378.

Id.

379.

See id. at 81-82.

380. See HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 28-35 (1979) (detailing pre-BTA judicial review).

1614

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1537

for a refund, 38 1 aggrieved taxpayers were limited to seeking
nonadversarial, informal review of their tax assessments before
the Committee on Appeals and Review. More often than not,
this Committee merely negotiated settlements rather than resolving disputed issues; and its decisions were subject to review
and amendment by the Solicitor of Internal Revenue as representative of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 38 2 Recognizing the suboptimality of this arrangement, Treasury proposed establishing the BTA, outside the Bureau of Internal
Revenue but still within the Treasury Department and under
the direct supervision and control of the Secretary of the
Treasury. 38 3 Responding to complaints that Treasury's proposal
did not go far enough in separating administration and enforcement from the review function, Congress went a step further and removed the BTA from Treasury altogether by giving
the power to appoint the BTA's members to the President with
Senate advice and consent and by limiting their removal to
4
cause. 38
In context, references to the BTA's "independence" more
likely refer to its organizational removal from the Department
of Treasury rather than to the standard of review for legal
questions before it. Noting the context and legislative history
behind the BTA's creation, Charles Hamel, the first Chairman,
characterized the BTA's role as judicial rather than legislative. 38 5 The Board accordingly used the courts rather than

other, more policy-oriented special tribunals as the model for
the BTA's procedural rules. 38 6 Early BTA opinions convey the
381. See id.
382. See id. at 42-43 (describing the Committee on Appeals and Review).
383. See id. Whereas the Committee on Appeals and Review was located
organizationally within the Bureau of Internal Revenue, under Treasury's
proposal, the BTA would have been located within the Treasury Department
but separate from the Bureau, and the Secretary would have had the authority to appoint members and to approve the Board's procedural rules. See id. at
52-53. The proposal at least implicitly gave the Secretary the power to remove
Board members as well. See id. at 55.
384. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 900(b), 43 Stat. 336,
337 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77 (2000)); see also DUBROFF, supra note 380,
at 56-58, 66-67.
385. See Charles D. Hamel, United States Board of Tax Appeals, 13 GEO.
L.J. 20, 24 (1924). In discussing the BTA's role, Hamel particularly noted the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission as examples of other special tribunals within the federal government, but described
them as having "a composite function to perform, both judicial and legislative,"
as opposed to the BTA's "purely judicial duty." Id.
386. See id.

2006]

THE NEED FOR MEAD

1615

BTA's adherence to the same deference principles applied by
387
the Article III courts.
Additionally, Coverdale notes Treasury's consistent position that its general authority regulations are interpretative
and thus exempt from the APA's notice and comment procedures. Although Coverdale takes at face value that Treasury in
practice uses notice and comment because it wants to and not
because it must, one could just as easily speculate that Treasury follows the APA process because it recognizes that its position is a dubious one.
Many other agencies face challenges to their adherence to
the APA's procedural requirements. 388 It is in Treasury's interest to assert the interpretative rule exemption as a potential
legal argument against such challenges. Moreover, Treasury is
inconsistent in distinguishing between its specific and general
authority regulations where its institutional interests support a
contrary position. Treasury blurs the distinction between the
two regulation types by citing I.R.C. § 7805(a) as the primary
authority for even regulations with arguable specific authority,
38 9
then asserts the interpretative rule exemption for them all.
By claiming that exemption, Treasury theoretically concedes
390
that its general authority regulations are not legally binding.
Yet Treasury treats specific and general authority regulations
equally for underpayment penalty purposes while taking a
more lenient position for less formal revenue rulings and notices. 391 Also at least post-Mead, the government regularly
387. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Comm'r, 26 BTA 277, 279 (1932) (describing specific authority Treasury regulations as, "if reasonable, hav[ing] the full force
and effect of law" and citing Supreme Court cases for that proposition); Green
River Distilling Co. v. Comm'r, 16 BTA 395, 399 (1929) (same); Appeal of Unif.
Printing & Supply Co., 9 BTA 251, 254 (1927) (deferring to a regulatory definition of "business league" as "reasonable" particularly in light of legislative reenactment); Appeal of Gottlieb Bros., 1 BTA 684, 686-87 (1925) (noting the
reasonableness and consistency of general authority Treasury regulation); see
also Cronin v. Comm'r, 37 BTA 914, 920 (1938) (recognizing the applicability
of Article III court deference principles); L.S. Donaldson Co., Inc. v. Comm'r,
12 BTA 271, 280 (1928) (same).
388. See, e.g., Transmission Access Policy Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667,
729 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (challenging the adequacy of a notice-of-proposed rulemaking); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(same); Pers. Watercraft Indus. Ass'n v. Dep't of Commerce, 48 F.3d 540, 54243 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (challenging an agency rule for failure to respond to comments).
389. See discussion supra notes 30, 33 and accompanying text.
390. See discussion supra note 30 and accompanying text.
391. See Treas. Reg. 1.6662-3 (2005).
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claims in litigation that general authority Treasury regulations
are Chevron-eligible, and thus asserts that such regulations
392
carry the force and effect of law.
Treasury's inconsistent and self-serving positions on the
characterization and effect of its own regulations render its
representations suspect. Accordingly, Treasury's characterization of its regulations should be heavily discounted for purposes
of assessing Chevron's applicability.
Finally, Coverdale observes that Congress's frequent tax
legislation and the detail thereof suggest Congress's preference
for making tax policy itself rather than leaving such matters to
Treasury. 393 Of course, such a sentiment, if true, would eliminate the need for I.R.C. § 7805(a). In fact, while Congress frequently revisits some sections of the Code, 394 it leaves others

392. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee at 16, Cansino v. Comm'r, 94
A.F.T.R.2d 2004-7256 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-73858); Brief for the Appellee at
34, Gorospe v. Comm'r, 2003 WL 22754007 (9th Cir.) (No. 03-70250); Brief for
Respondent at 46, Fowler v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 281 (2002) (No. 1188598); see also Reply Brief for Respondent at 301, Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v.
Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005) (Nos. 6163-03, 6164-03) (claiming both
Chevron and National Muffler deference). But see Corrected Brief for the Appellee at 74-76, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'r, 311 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2002) (No.
01-71584) (arguing for National Muffler deference only where appellant had
conceded its applicability in the court below).
393. See Coverdale, supra note 122, at 87.
394. For example, Congress has amended I.R.C. § 1 (2000), which establishes various tax rates, in eight of the last ten years, more often than not extensively, and in one year more than once. See Working Families Tax Relief
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §§ 101, 105, 402, 408, 118 Stat. 1166, 116769, 1184-86, 1190-91 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 102-105, 107, 301303, 117 Stat. 752, 754-55, 758-64 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Holocaust Restitution Tax Fairness Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-358, 116 Stat.
3015, 3015 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Economic Growth & Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 101, 302, 901, 115 Stat. 38,
41-44, 54, 150 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Omnibus Consolidated
and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105277, §§ 4002-03, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-906 to 2681-910 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, §§ 6005,
6007, 112 Stat. 685, 796-811 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 311, 118
Stat. 788, 831-36 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. § 1
(2005)); Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188,
§ 1704, 110 Stat. 1755, 1878-91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)). Congress revisited another provision, I.R.C. § 179 (2000),
which allows certain taxpayers to deduct the cost of certain depreciable assets
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untouched for years or even decades. 395 In some Code sections,
Congress provides great detail; 396 but other Code sections are
astonishingly vague, prompting extensive Treasury regulations
to fill in the gaps. 397 Congress changes some of the tax laws of-

ten in response to political and economic trends and events; but
in areas that rouse less political interest, Congress clearly relies upon Treasury to exercise its authority under I.R.C.
§ 7805(a) to respond to changing circumstances and to fill unanticipated ambiguities.
D. SUMMARY
As per Mead, whether Chevron deference applies to Treasury regulations depends upon whether Congress and the
agency intended for them to carry the force and effect of law. It
immediately rather than over time, three times during the same period. See
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 201, 118 Stat.
1418, 1429 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 202, 117 Stat. 752, 757-58 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)); Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-188, § 1111, 110 Stat. 1755, 1758 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2005)).
395. Randolph Paul observed as early as 1939 that "Congress in tax legislation usually hits only the high spots which are forced upon its attention by
conspicuous judicial decisions or which are called to its attention by the
Treasury and diligent taxpayers." Paul, supra note 164, at 665. The Code has
only grown in both size and complexity since Paul's observation, rendering his
observation even more accurate today. The rules governing "passive foreign
investment companies" (PFICs) are illustrative of the problem. Congress
adopted a complicated set of rules for taxing PFICs in 1986 and gave Treasury
broad, specific authority to promulgate regulations interpreting the PFIC provisions. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1235, 100 Stat.
2085, 2566-76; see also I.R.C. § 1298(f) (2000) (redesignated from former I.R.C.
§ 1297(d)). The PFIC rules contained many unanswered questions, gaps, and
ambiguities; and while Treasury started to elaborate and clarify the PFIC
rules with proposed regulations in 1992, those proposed regulations have been
sharply criticized, and Treasury has never finalized them. See generally Kevin
M. Cunningham, The PFIC Rules: The Case of Throwing the Baby Out With
the Bathwater, 21 VA. TAX REV. 387 (2002). Notwithstanding these problems
as well as dramatic increases in cross-border transactions and innovations in
multinational business structures, Congress has made only a few, minor technical amendments to the PFIC regulations in the last twenty years.
396. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163 (2000) (providing for the deductibility of interest
expense); id. §§ 901-908 (providing for foreign tax credit); id. §§ 1271-1275
(covering original issue discount).
397. For example, I.R.C. § 61 (2000) defines gross income by listing several
obvious sources but also stating the list is not exclusive and that gross income
is "from whatever source derived." Currently, Treasury has promulgated sixteen final, five proposed, and one temporary regulation elaborating this section.
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is plausible that Congress originally intended that at least general authority Treasury regulations should not be legally binding, particularly when one considers the understanding of the
nondelegation doctrine common in the era in which Congress
adopted the Code. Nevertheless, the nondelegation doctrine has
long since passed as a serious obstacle to viewing general authority Treasury regulations as legally binding. More recent,
post-Chevron congressional action particularly with respect to
the Code's penalty provisions, but also regarding the Regulatory Flexibility Act, strongly support a conclusion that Congress intends for all Treasury regulations-general and specific
authority-to carry the force and effect of law.
While Treasury continues to maintain its position that the
general authority regulations are interpretative and not subject
to APA notice and comment requirements, Treasury's actions
speak louder than its words: Treasury utilizes notice and comment procedures in promulgating all of its regulations, considers itself bound by the interpretations advanced in those regulations, and asserts the applicability of Chevron deference in
litigation. Should any taxpayer actually challenge even a general authority Treasury regulation on grounds that Treasury
failed properly to satisfy the APA's notice and comment requirements, it seems a virtual certainty that the courts would
conclude that all Treasury regulations are in fact legislative in
character. To the extent that the Court has made clear the
Chevron-eligibility of legislative regulations promulgated
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, such a characterization should be dispositive for the question of Chevron's applicability. Once one strips away the tax-exceptionalist strain of the
argument, the case for Chevron deference for Treasury regulations is quite straight-forward.
CONCLUSION
Interpreting statutory ambiguity, at least as often as not,
requires making policy choices. Where the Code is susceptible
of more than one reasonable alternative answer, either Treasury or the courts will be primarily responsible for choosing
among them. Judicial deference principles ultimately attempt
to strike a balance on that score between agencies like Treasury and the courts. Chevron allows the courts to avoid interfering in policy matters and still police agency adherence to established processes and keep agencies from going beyond the
boundaries of congressionally delegated authority.
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Skepticism of the motivations and abilities of regulatory
agencies like Treasury in making such choices is not a new
phenomenon. Chevron has its critics, as do Mead and
Skidmore, on both doctrinal and normative grounds. Chevron
reflects a very powerful pro-agency bias; and perhaps some opponents are simply more trusting of the courts' ability to choose
between competing policies rendered permissible by ambiguous
statutes. Ironically, notwithstanding the tax community's resistance to Chevron deference for Treasury regulations, few tax
scholars or practitioners would assert that the courts do a very
good job of interpreting the Code, particularly in more complicated tax cases. Meanwhile, the fluidity of Skidmore's multifactor analysis renders that standard difficult to apply with consistency, while ambiguities in the Court's analysis in Mead
leave the particulars of its application uncertain.
Whatever the failings and pitfalls of Chevron, Mead, and
Skidmore, acknowledging them is not the same thing as supporting tax exceptionalism. There can be no doubt that Chevron, Mead, and Skidmore today represent the dominant standard for evaluating agency interpretations of the statutes they
administer. The claims of many in the tax community that tax
should be different simply do not bear out when examined in
the broader, comparative context. Doctrinally, the pre-Chevron
history of the Court's deference jurisprudence tracks quite
closely between tax and non-tax cases, as does the scholarly
analysis thereof. It is only in the post-Chevron era that the notion of tax exceptionalism really began to take hold, admittedly
assisted by muddled and inconclusive rhetoric from the Court.
Unsettled as the doctrine may now be, however, the normative
case for distinguishing tax from non-tax cases simply fails
when tax and non-tax practices are laid side by side. The clear
intent of Congress as well as Treasury is that general and specific authority Treasury regulations both are legally binding on
taxpayers and the government alike. Whatever Mead may
mean in more marginal cases, Treasury regulations present an
easy case for Chevron deference.

